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Executive summary 
Introduction 
Over the next decade New Zealand must make important decisions that will 
strongly determine its future energy development pathway. Two strategic issues 
are of vital importance: 
the need for the energy sector to respond to the Government's policy 
of reducing CO2 emissions, 
the need to develop a viable energy strategy to take the country beyond 
the depletion of the Maui gas field. 
Recent energy forecasts have detailed a business-as-usual approach to New 
Zealands energy future. The business-as-usual pathway follows the trend of 
recent years, indicating continued rising energy consumption over the next two 
decades. The pathway emphasises the need to develop new energy supplies from 
conventional energy sources - coal, oil, gas and hydro-electricity - to meet 
anticipated demands. However, this pathway seems to exacerbate problems that 
New Zealand needs to deal with over the coming decades. Instead of reducing 
CO2 emissions towards the Government's target of a 20% cut in CO2 by 2000, 
emissions would increase by 40% by 2010. Instead of moderating energy 
demand in anticipation of the rundown of the Maui gas field, growth in demand 
would continue, requiring new sources of energy to be discovered and developed. 
Instead of contributing in a positive way to the needs of a sustainable global 
energy system a business-as-usual approach contributes little. It will fail to bring 
CO2 emissions under control, let alone achieve cuts. It will fail to contribute 
to the necessary technology transformation required to develop and deploy 
environmentally-benign energy technologies (those that minimise the 
environmental harms from energy use) to both the developed and developing 
world. It is the contention of this study that such a pathway is unsustainable. 
A new pathway 
Trend need not be destiny. There is a need to focus on a vision of a different 
pathway for New Zealands energy future - to create an "alternative future". A 
new pathway would be based on two key strategies: 
progressively improving energy efficiency i.e. using less energy to deliver 
the same level of service, 
gradually introducing renewable energy technologies, based on the 
current advances in new-technology solar systems. 
This strategy would not only provide long term environmental benefits, it 
promises to offer the potential for considerable economic benefit as well. It is 
a pathway of opportunity. It is a pathway that needs a full and immediate 
evaluation. 
This pathway does not mean a sacrifice in the level of energy services compared 
with business-as-usual. An alternative "sustainable energy" pathway outlined in 
this study indicates that by 2020, the same level of energy services could be 
delivered to consumers by using only two-thirds of the primary energy that a 
business-as-usual pathway would require. 
1960 1970 
, 
1980 1900 
Year 
Sustainable energy 
2000 2010 2020 
Energy requirements for a sustainable energy compared to a 
business-as-usual pathway. 
The sustainable energy pathway would require the following outcomes to be 
achieved: 
end-use efficiency needs to improve at an average of one percent per 
year compared to business-as-usual. This is considered to be readily 
achievable given some purposeful goals within the appropriate 
institutional setting. Attention must be given to pricing and the 
creation of efficiency markets, and to equity issues, 
energy transformation losses (energy wasted in transforming one type 
of energy to another e.g. gas to electricity) need to be systematically 
reduced over the next two decades, 
renewable energy sources, in particular new-technology solar-based 
systems need to be progressively deployed from about 2005 onwards, to 
take over from declining indigenous gas and oil production. By 2010, 
about 5%, and by 2020, about 20% of primary energy would come from 
these technologies. 
Introduce new insights and innovations 
Optimism over the feasibility of such a pathway comes mainly from 
developments and innovations overseas, and the belief that these developments 
can be readily transferred to the New Zealand setting. Systematic improvements 
in end-use efficiency are occurring under purposeful institutional settings, 
including pricing policies, and with the advent of new technology. The past 
decade has also seen systematic cost reductions in new-technology solar systems, 
in particular wind generation and photovoltaics. Both manufacturers and energy 
suppliers are confident that further significant cost reductions will occur, and 
that many of these technologies will be fully cost-competitive with some 
conventional energy sources within a decade. 
New Zealand is ideally placed to bring new-technology systems on-stream in a 
systematic way early next decade. Energy supply over the next decade is 
projected to be relatively secure, and thus it provides a stable base to investigate, 
and phase in, new energy systems. The next few years provide a unique 
opportunity for New Zealand to move quickly onto the technological learning 
curve. But a move towards solar-based energy systems also offers another big 
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benefit for New Zealand. These systems are low risk in that they do not entail 
high, upfront capital expenditure, and they do not require long lead times for 
construction. They can be deployed as incremental chunks of capacity when 
needed. They get around one of the major problems that has plagued energy 
development in New Zealand over the last two decades - the focus on large 
energy developments that have overstretched the relatively small New Zealand 
economy, and created alternative "shortages" and "surpluses" prior to, and after, 
the development. 
An early move towards renewable energy sources also creates the opportunity 
to establish a competitive industry base around renewable technologies. The 
international market for environmentally-benign energy technologies is likely to 
continue its current growth path well into the future. 
Producing renewable energy technologies could also provide a positive 
contribution to the needed technology transfer to developing countries. Up 
until now New Zealand's stance on CO2 emission reductions has been based on 
moral suasion - symbolically important but unlikely on its own to have much 
effect. If New Zealand is really serious about reducing CO2 emissions globally, 
then it needs to be rather more positive in its approach. The ability to provide 
solar-based technologies and technological expertise would be one of the more 
positive approaches New Zealand could take. 
A permanent solution to CO2 emissions 
A sustainable energy path addresses the CO2 problem in a permanent manner. 
Whereas the business-as-usual approach regards CO2 emissions targets as a 
"threat" to the economy, this study suggests that we should be turning such 
threats into opportunities. The sustainable energy pathway outlined here 
achieves major and permanent cuts in CO2 emissions in the medium to long-
term. It does not achieve the Government's target of 20% reduction by 2000, 
rather, emissions are stabilised by 2000, and progressively cut from then on. 
By 2020, CO2 emissions are 50% of today's levels. 
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New Zealand is one of a handful of countries taking an activist role in setting 
a CO2 emission reduction target. That New Zealand's effort, on its own, will 
bring about an insignificant reduction in emissions in relation to the global total 
is a well recognised fact. The policy is, however, acknowledgement that 
developed countries in particular, have a moral responsibility to act, despite 
uncertainties. The New Zealand Government is looking to meet its greenhouse 
targets by utilising "win-win" strategies, where CO2 reductions provide more 
than solely environmental benefits. An early move towards a sustainable energy 
pathway offers hope for considerably better than that: 
WIN 
WIN 
WIN 
WIN 
Getting started 
confront the looming supply "gap" and move towards a 
permanently sustainable energy system 
bring CO2 emissions under control and rapidly reduce them 
after the turn of the century 
create an industry base built on genuine competitive advantage, 
with a captive world market 
develop and deploy the technology to allow developing 
countries to leap-frog the fossil fuel development phase. 
While there are some encouraging signs that moves are being made in this 
direction, it seems unlikely that this pathway can self-start simply under the 
incentives of the free market. There are many road blocks in the path. These 
include the parlous state of the New Zealand economy, the propensity for New 
Zealand to undervalue and underprice its energy, the predominance of business-
as-usual thinking in energy decision making, the lack of wider participation in 
energy matters, and the lack of purposeful direction to energy policy. There is 
also a lack of belief that an alternative pathway to business-as-usual could be 
viable. 
The sustainable energy approach outlined here is not fanciful - the more one 
looks into it the more logical and compelling it becomes. To move on to the 
pathway will require an evolving transformation in our approach to energy. It 
will require a national commitment to energy policy, a purposeful approach to 
meeting energy Objectives, and an encouragement of technological innovation. 
What needs to be given urgent attention is the required "nudge" to get this 
process underway. But once on that pathway, there is reason to believe that the 
evolutionary process of Change will provide mutual reinforcement for the 
required transformation. New technologies will reinforce new institutions, which 
will reinforce new values, and vice versa. 
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Introduction 
The notion of sustainable development has parachuted into our modern idiom. The World 
Commission on Environment and Development1 (hereafter referred to as the Brundtland 
Commission) can take much of the credit for "commercialising" the concept, although they certainly 
did not invent it. Nevertheless, the Commission's definition of sustainable development, 
"development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their needs", has become a widely used point of reference. 
In New Zealand, "the sustainability of natural and physical resources" is part of the long title of the 
Environment Act 1986. Now, the Resource Management Act 1991 has as its purpose the promotion 
of "the sustainable management of natural and physical resources". 
Be it under the guise of "sustainable development" (as used by the Brundtland Commission), 
"sustainable management", "sustainable growth,,2, or just sustainability, it is nevertheless generally 
accepted that if something is sustainable it "is a good thing". That, at least, is a promising start. 
The difficulty, it seems, is in operationalising the concept. The question invariably turns to what 
should be sustained? In what quantity and quality? Who should decide and how? New Zealand 
is not alone in grappling with this Challenge. Prominent US environmental analyst Richard 
Norgaard has observed that: 
"the call for sustainable development in the latter 1980s appears pretty 
vague ... environmentalists want environmental systems sustained. Consumers want 
consumption sustained. Workers want jobs sustained..All are threatened.· Thus 
sustainability is called to and being called by many. With the term meaning something 
different to everyone, the quest for sustainable development is off to a cacophonous 
start. 3 
This reaction should come as no surprise. The dictionary definition of "to sustain" means essentially 
to keep going continuously; as such it implies a non-changing state. Yet "sustainable development" 
is explicitly recognised as a "process of change,,4. Notions of Change that challenge the status quo, 
challenge the considerable vested interests that wish to see the status quo maintained. The resulting 
tensions produce conflicts and contradictions. The conflicts, at least in the short term, are 
unavoidable. The contradictions are avoidable, but some have not been avoided. 
For instance, energy is at the core of the sustainable development concept. Energy is ubiquitous, 
driving all processes both natural and human-made. The impacts of its production and use are 
everywhere. Sustainable development could not have meaning as a national goal unless it were also 
a goal of energy policyS. In New Zealand we now have a Resource Management Act that has as 
its primary purpose the sustainable management of resources. But we lack any corresponding energy 
policy that explicitly supports this purpose. Can we manage our resource base sustainably without 
also addressing the unsustainable use of our energy resources? Such apparent ambiguities seem 
typical of the New Zealand response to sustainable development so far6. 
Nevertheless the Government has Signalled its clear intention to reduce the environmental impact 
of our energy use by setting a CO2 reduction target. An interim goal of a 20% reduction in CO2 
emissions by the year 2000 (cf. 1990 levelS) has been set, one of the more stringent in the world. 
Meanwhile, other strategic energy issues are looming for New Zealand, the most important being 
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the replacement for Maui gas. Maui gas currently provides one-third of the primary energy supply 
of the country and is expected to be depleted by about 2005. 
This publication seeks to give meaning to the sustainable development concept as it applies to 
energy supply in New Zealand. It is a broad attempt at outlining a vision of a pathway consistent 
with sustainable development over the next three decades. The publication is presented in three 
sections: 
Section A outlines and summarises principles of sustainable energy development, and 
presents the emerging international consensus. 
Section B outlines energy supply, past and present in New Zealand, and reviews the 
"business-as-usual" pathway to the future. 
Section C proposes, and expands on, an alternative "sustainability" pathway, in which the 
principles of sustainable development underpin the strategic direction for energy supply and 
use. The barriers and opportunities to this pathway are examined. 
This study has been produced as part of the Centre for Resource Management's research programme 
funded by the Ministry for the Environment. However, it does not necessarily represent the views 
of the Ministry for the Environment. Neither is it written with the expressed aim of supporting 
specific environmental objectives such as the CO2 emissions target. Rather, it is hoped that this 
publication can serve as a stimulus for wider public discussion and future action. 
Notes and references 
1. World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987. Our Common Future. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 400p. 
2. Daly, H. 1990. Toward some operational principles of sustainllble development. Ecological Economics 2: 1-6 has argued 
that the term sustainable growth should be rejected as a bad oxymoron, since in a finite global ecosystem growth cannot 
be sustainable over long periods of time. 
3. Norgaard, R.B. 1988. Sustainable development: a co-evolutionary point of view. Futures 20(6): 606-620. 
4. WCED, Our Common Future, op. cit. 
5. Wright, J. 1991. Indicators of sustainable energy development. Information Paper No. 28. Centre for Resource 
Management, Lincoln University. 24p. 
6. A broader analysis of the way sustainable development has been addressed in New Zealand is contained in McChesney, I.G. 
1991. The Brundtland Report and sustainable development in New Zealand. Information Paper No. 25. Centre for 
Resource Management, Lincoln University. 72p. 
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SECflON A 
Sustainable development 
This section discusses the concept of sustainable 
development in an international setting, and looks at the 
requirements of an energy strategy from this perspective. 
The section discusses the principles and strategic 
imperatives of a sustainable energy pathway. 
CHAPTER 1 
Overview 
"Many present development trends leave increasing numbers of people poor and 
vulnerable, while at the same time degrading the environment. How can such 
development serve next century's world of twice as many people relying on the same 
environment?" (Brundtland Commission, 1987)1 
1.1 We have a problem 
During the 1980s three interrelated global crises have emerged in ways that have made their impacts 
impossible to ignore: poverty, environmental breakdown, and social violence. They all represent a 
failure of developmentz. These failures demonstrate that the systems by which we manage our 
relationships with one another and with our natural environment are not working. Our present path 
of development is damaging to both people and the earth. 
It is not just a minority lobby that is coming to this conclusion. The Brundtland Commission, which 
comprised 22 elite politicians and functionaries, came to the same conclusion. In April 1987, after 
three years of extensive investigations and deliberations into the state of the global environment, 
they reported their findings to the world. The Commissioners came to a blunt assessment about the 
impact of most of humankind's current development trends. They are unsustainable - that is if 
people continue with current patterns of development, and continue to reproduce at present rates, 
then they will narrow the chances of prosperity, or even of safe and secure livelihoods, for the next 
and subsequent generations3. The Commission urgently called on all countries of the world to 
reverse these trends and to adopt policies consistent with the theme of "sustainable development". 
The Brundtland Report was presented to the United Nations General Assembly in October 1987 
and a resolution of approval was passed. Meanwhile the Report had been presented to the 
governments or leaders of over 100 nations and met with no serious objections or disagreements. 
Yet in the four years since the Brundtland Report was issued little apparent change is obvious. The 
environment is still largely regarded as being outside of economic affairs. As the Worldwatch 
Institute Director Lester Brown recently pointed out global economi~ indicators continue to paint 
a rosy view of the future. Yet every major indicator of the environment shows a deterioration in 
natural systems4• The issues of unsustainable development outlined by the Brundtland Commission 
have not gone away in the last four years. Rather, they have intensified. The predominant response 
has been a continuation of the typical reaction throughout most of the 1980s -to deny that anything 
was fundamentally wrong. The United Nations has referred to the 1980s as the "lost decade". It 
has been alternatively described as the "decade of denial',5. . 
1.2 Confronting the "new realities" 
Setting the context for any appropriate response to unsustainable development is an understanding 
of what can be described as the "new realities" - that must be recognised and managed. 
Foremost is the rapid and accelerating process of "globalisation". This has pervaded most aspects 
of life including technology and production; employment and work; trade and finance; information; 
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militarization; pollution and resource depletion; consumption patterns and culture; and leisure 
and recreation6. These activities are interactive, and the processes are accelerating and irreversible. 
The result is that the international interdependence between individuals, communities and nations 
and the natural environment is being continually strengthened. 
A second reality is the changing nature of change. Business consultant Charles Handy has recently 
pointed out that "change is not what it used to be,,7. Only 30 years ago we thought change meant 
more of the same, only better. This no longer holds true. No longer is change secure and 
predictable. We are entering an era of what he describes as "discontinuous change" - where old 
ideas and means of organisation are being overturned. It is a confusing, disturbing and unstable 
time. 
A third reality is that our now well-recognised environmental problems lie rooted in the 
development process itselt8. For decades prophetic voices have warned of the problems we were 
creating for ourselves and future generations by our apparently insatiable demands on nature's goods 
and services. As time goes by two conclusions appear inescapable; first, the problems appear to be 
more serious than first indicated; and second, the longer we delay action on problem solving the 
more intractable these problems become9. Many people are now caught in a downward and self-
reinforcing spiral of poverty and environmental degradation. The Brundtland Commission stressed 
that much of what was unsustainable in the world today was a result of the unevenness of 
development and a product of the relative neglect of economic and social justice within and amongst 
nations: 
"Poverty is a major cause and effect of global environmental problems. It is therefore 
futile to attempt to deal with environmental problems without a broader perspective 
that encompasses the factors underlying world poverty and international 
inequality ,,10. 
According to the Commission, the sustainable development agenda must have as its "overriding 
priority" the fulfilment of basic needs of all people in the world. But the Commission also explicitly 
recognised that development must be bounded by ecological constraints and considered that "at a 
minimum, sustainable development must not endanger the natural systems that support life on earth: 
the atmosphere, the waters, the soils and the living beings"l1. 
1.3 Sustainability - old ideas for new? 
The sense that modern development is unsustainable, that it is heading down a dangerous and 
destructive pathway has prompted people to look to the past to rediscover "new" or forgotten 
insights. 
Despite its contemporary "rebirth", sustainability is consistent with old traditions of stewardShip, 
kaitiakitanga, and others. It reflects much of what is regarded as traditional wisdom. Sustainability 
was the original economy of our species12. To a greater or lesser extent, the sustainability of our 
forebears' way of life was maintained by a particular consciousness of nature. There was a spiritual 
connection between people and the animals and plants on which they subsisted. People were a part 
of nature, not set apart as masters. 
People are also looking to the past, or to . non-western cultures, to rediscover a new sense of values 
and social cohesion. The teachings and traditional wisdom of many traditional cultures and religions 
has stressed what can be called ''voluntary simplicity" - the rejection of riches and personal wealth 
in favour of a simpler, more spiritually-based existence13 14. In essence, it is a search for quality, 
rather then quantity. 
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1.4 Sustainable development as new ways of thinking and acting 
Lessons of history serve as a valuable guidepost to the future. But the past cannot be recreated. 
"To resolve the global crisis we must achieve basic changes in the way we think and 
act,,15. 
David Korten has argued that transformation defines the essential sustainable development priority 
for the 1990s. This involves transforming our values, our institutions, and our technologies16. 
In addressing the question of values, former head of the EPA in the US (and one of the Brundtland 
Commissioners) William Ruckelshaus has stated that the new world view needs a new consciousness. 
He has proposed these fundamental beliefs: 
the human species is part of nature. Its existence depends on its ability to draw sustenance 
from a finite natural world; its continuance depends on its ability to abstain from destroying 
the natural systems that regenerate this world, 
economic activity must be organised to account for the environmental costs of production, 
maintenance of a livable global environment depends on the sustainable development of the 
entire human family17. 
Another way of viewing this new consciousness is to frame it within the context of our 
responsibilities to future generations and the question of inter-generational equity. Jan Wright has 
proposed a "hierarchy of responsibilities" in the way in which we manage resources18. These are 
outlined in Box 1.1. 
On the question of "unallowable harms", Wright suggests three questions that might be a starting 
point for determining the "allowability" of environmental harms: first, is the impact of human 
activity potentially reversible? second, what is the scale and distribution of the impact? and third, 
what is the quality of our knowledge about the impact? 
These provide at least the starting point to developing a set of principles to guide the new ways of 
acting. 
The Brundtland Commission also pOinted out that our concern for the welfare of future people must 
also logically extend to include concern for the welfare of current peoples who are disadvantaged 
or caught in the downward spiral of poverty/environmental degradation. Hence, sustainable 
development must concern itself with equity, both between generations and within generations. 
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Sustainable development is not just about developing a new ethic between people and nature. It 
is also about developing a new ethic between all peoples. 
This ethic must spread to the institutions we construct to organise political, social and economic 
activity. The nature of the economic process dictates much of the way people relate to nature and 
to each other. Hence, transformation towards a new economics that is consistent with new values 
and the new realities is considered crucial19. 
Third, the transformation must extend to the nature of technology: technologies must become 
efficient in their use of resources, minimise pollution by employing pollution prevention techniques, 
utilise and re-utilise recycled materials, minimise environmental impact, and enhance human well 
beingZo. 
15 Sustainable development as a process of change 
Although it is often portrayed as such, sustainability is not an end-state. It is impossible to define 
future end-states when the global economy is undergoing such rapid change in both its natural and 
human-built environment. Sustainable development, therefore, is a process of change along a new 
pathway of development: a pathway in which "the exploitation of resources, the direction of 
investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are made 
consistent with future as well as present needs"Zl. 
The idea that humanity is at some kind of historic watershed has been around for the last decade 
or so. To some, the fact that it has been talked about for years and has not yet happened is 
evidence enough that it will not happen. 
If development is to be sustainable a major Change in direction is inevitable. But the nature of this 
turnaround is full of complexity. Two perspectives are given below: 
"Our species is now at its most important turning point since the agricultural 
revolution. For the first time humanity has the knowledge to destroy itself quickly, and 
for the first time humanity also has the knowledge to take its own evolution into its 
hands and change now"zz. 
'!The conventional image is that of a crossroads: a forced choice of one direction or 
another that determines the future for some appreciable period. But this does not at 
all capture the complexity of the current situation. A more appropriate image would 
be that of a canoeist shooting the rapids: survival depends on continually responding 
to information by correct steering"Z3. 
These perspectives highlight several central principles of the sustainable development path. First, 
all future options entail uncertainties and risks. Second, the application of knowledge and 
information is of prime importance. But that knowledge must be of "high quality". Third, new 
development strategies must anticipate and prevent negative environmental and social outcomes. 
Fourth, strategies must also be adaptive to rapidly changing circumstances. Underpinning this is the 
necessity for a process to allow this to happen, and for just and equitable outcomes to be achieved. 
This will rely on broad ranging participatory processes. 
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1.6 Summary 
The global environment is at present in the process of vast and unprecedented change, much of it 
having a negative impact on the earth's vital life support functions and on human welfare. It 
represents a failure of development. 
At its broadest, "sustainable development" is the embodiment of an emerging new paradigm - a new 
world view, a new way of thinking and acting. Sustainable development is based on the 
interdependence of economic and social activity and environmental quality - without a healthy 
environment, social and economic activity is threatened. Its core philosophy is the promotion of 
harmony amongst human beings and between humanity and nature. The sustainable development 
pathway calls for a transformation in values, perceptions, institutions and technology. It requires 
a development process that does not destroy the natural resources and environmental systems on 
which it depends. 
It is clear that sustainable development is not about sustaining all activities. The finiteness of the 
biosphere sets priorities. It is about sustaining the basic life support mechanisms as a priority. It 
is about sustaining levels of natural capital. And it is about sustaining the basic needs of all the 
world's peoples. 
There are road signs, but there is no road map for sustainable development. Sustainable 
development is not an end-state that we can picture from where we currently stand. Sustainable 
development principles must be applied to influence future directions. But the process of 
sustainable development must also be adaptive to a world of uncertainty. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The issue of unsustainable energy development 
"Present energy systems based largely on the burning of fossil fuels are the most obviously 
unsustainable of human activities. Present levels of use of fossil fuels are warming the 
planet; yet population growth and any conceivable form of "development" for the three-
quarters of humankind who live in the South will require more energy". (Holmberg et al., 
1991)1 
It is often more straightforward to approach the sustainable energy agenda by focusing on the 
unsustainable aspects of our energy supply and use. This unsustainability has two distinct (although inter-
related) aspects: adverse impacts on the physical environment, and impacts on people's livelihoods and 
social systems. 
2.1 Environmental harms 
The most obviously unsustainable aspect of energy use is the level of environmental harms caused by 
energy production and consumption. These harms are essentially of two types. First they are caused by 
waste discharges exceeding the capacity of the environment to absorb them without producing adverse 
effects. The specific harms can be characterised as (1) release of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide during 
the combustion of fossil fuels causing localised and regional air pollution and acidification of the 
environment; (2) release of CO2 into the atmosphere through the combustion and use of fossil fuels, 
creating the potential for climate change (this also applies to nitrogen oxides); (3) release of methane into 
the atmosphere through leakage from natural gas production, distribution and storage facilities (and from 
coal mines), again creating the potential for climate change; (4) release into the environment of long-liVed 
radioactive wastes; and (5) toxic discharges through energy production activities (e.g. mining activities, 
energy transformation activities, oil spills). The impacts span an enormous range - from minor, localised 
and reversible (Le. low level waste heat emissions at power stations), through to global in scale with major 
and irreversible impacts (i.e. the threat of climate change through the release of greenhouse gases). 
Over the last five years the threat of climate change has emerged as the dominant environmental concern. 
According to calculations carried out by the World Resources Institute, energy sector emissions comprise 
49% of the contribution to greenhouse gas buildup from human activity. Seventy percent of this comprises 
CO2 from the combustion of fossil fuels2• The atmospheric lifetime of CO2 is over 100 years, and the 
estimated time for atmospheric CO2 to adjust to changes in sources or sinks is 50-200 years because of 
the slow exchange of carbon between surface waters and deep layers of the ocean3. In late 1990, Working 
Group 1 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reported with certainty th::.t emissions 
resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse 
gases, and that these increases will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an additional 
warming of the earth's surface. It was the IPCC's judgement that temperatures had increased by 0.3-0.6°C 
over the last 100 years, and while this was consistent with the predictions of climate models it was not 
absolute proof of human-induced warming4. 
A second category of environmental harm is that associated with the loss of other amenity values caused 
by energy production activities. In many developing countries deforestation and desertification caused by 
the demand for fuelwood is one of the major causes of widespread and irreversible environmental 
degradationS. On a lesser scale, hydro electric dams flood river valleys and productive farmland, and may 
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lead to ongoing riverbank erosion. Surface coal mining may lead to permanent loss of productive land. 
Lesser still (although not unimportant) are such things as the visual impacts of energy production e.g. 
power pylons or wind turbines may diminish the amenity value of particular landscapes. 
22 Reliance on non renewable resources 
Our current reliance on non renewable (fossil) energy resources carries a triple punch - not only is it these 
energy types that contribute most to environmental degradation, but the more accessible and desirable 
energy forms are being depleted, while increased use of the most abundant form of fossil energy for the 
future (coal) entails even greater environmen~al impact. 
From a strict interpretation of sustainability it is obvious that reliance on non renewable resources cannot 
be continued indefinitely i.e. that it is unsustainable. But as was discussed in the previous chapter, the 
moral argument for preserving these resources for future generations is not as strong as other obligations 
to future generations. The unsustainability of our current heavy reliance on non renewable resources is 
related more to questions about the resilience of social, economic and political structures that have been 
sustained by cheap energy than it is about the imminent prospects of absolute Shortages. In the short term 
at least, it is more a question of relative shortage and distribution, rather than absolute shortage. 
Indeed, at a global level the proven reserves of fossil energy have increased between 1970 and 1990 from 
35 to 43 years for oil (at current rates of consumption), and from 45 to 58 years for gas6• This lends 
some superficial credibility to the argument that we will never "run out" of these resources as the 
functioning of markets and new technologies will allow new reserves to be continually discovered and 
exploited. 
However, this is not really the point. The reserves figures above are averages that disguise a growing 
imbalance in distribution between regions of the world. In 1980 the Persian Gulf region had 55% of 
proven global oil reserves; by 1989 this had risen to 65%7. At current extraction rates, reserves remaining 
in the Middle East are estimated at 110 years compared with less than 20 years worth now in Europe, 
North America and the Soviet UnionS. The global distribution of natural gas reserves also shows major 
regional imbalances, with diminishing reserves in the US in particular.9 
Increasing reliance on energy imports from what have in the past been politically unstable regions is more 
an issue of the unsustainability of political, economic and social systems that have been built on cheap oil. 
The danger, as Christopher Flavin from the Worldwatch Institute sees it, is that "not only is the world 
addicted to cheap oil, but the largest liquor store is in a very dangerous neighbourhood"lO. 
23 Inefficient utilisation 
The problems of environmental degradation and depletion of stocks of high quality energy are exacerbated 
by our inefficient utilisation of energy. Many energy activities are highly inefficient. The internal 
combustion engine, the heart of the global transport system, operates typically at about 20-35% 
efficiencyll. Other losses inherent in vehicles brings overall efficiency down even lower. Thermal power 
stations operate at efficiencies of typically 30-35%, while further losses occur in the transmission and 
conversion of electricity to provide a useful service. All these efficiencies are device dependent. If instead 
we were to look at efficiency in terms of task then efficiencies (called second law efficiencies) become 
much lower still12• 
While our demand for energy today translates into a demand for particular energy sources, what we really 
want is energy services. Energy demand is not a demand directly for energy, but rather for the services 
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that energy provides. People do not want electricity, oil or coal as such, but rather comfortable rooms, 
light, vehicular motion, hot water and other tangible things13. 
Providing energy services in general requires transforming primary energy sources into a useful form, and 
then converting this energy to provide functional services (Le. to provide work, heat etc.). Much of what 
is environmentally unsustainable about energy use is a mismatch between source and service. For example, 
adherents of second law efficiency concepts maintain that "the use of a high quality flame ... to provide 
low quality, low-temperature heat is a fundamental abuse"l4. 
24 Inequitable distnlmtion of the rosts and benefits of energy 
The basic needs of a large number of the world's people are not being met, and this includes their basic 
needs for energy. There exists a large disparity in energy consumption between different nations of the 
world. The 24% of the population living in the richest countries use 77% of the energy, while the 76% 
living in the poorest countries use just 23% of the energy. Per capita consumption averaged just 0.4 kW 
for those living in "low income" countries, 1.1 kW for middle income countries and 6.7 kW for high 
income countriesl5. . 
Yet even these figures fail to illustrate the true picture conCerning the lack of energy services available to 
many people. In rural areas of many third world countries for instance most of the energy is supplied from 
fuelwood. Yet fuelwood is in increasingly short supplyl6. And despite the enormous technological 
advances in energy systems in the developed world (and in some farts of the developing- world) the energy 
system most essential to most people on earth is the bonfirel . As a source of heat it is enormously 
inefficient. Thus, the per capita energy consumption figures given above grossly overstate the level of 
energy service available for many people living in the developing world. Intrinsically linked to the lack 
of energy to provide basic needs is therefore a lack of basic, efficient energy conversion devices. 
There is also inequity in terms of the allocation of costs of energy use. In most countries energy prices 
fail to include social and environmental costs. Most of the benefits of fossil fuel use have accrued to the 
world's "wealthy" (most of whom live in developed countries). However, the costs of climate warming, 
if it occurs as anticipated, will fall on future generations, and is likely to have an impact on people in 
developing countries more so than in developed countries. This is not just a question of the geographic 
location of developing countries. Developing countries will have less resources with which to adapt to 
change. In addition their economies will be less resilient to climate changes because they are more closely 
tied to agriculturel8. 
Total global energy consumption is on a steadily rising pathway that has been disrupted only briefly by the 
two oil shocks in the early 19708 and early 19808. A continuation of energy growth through to the turn 
of the century and beyond is assumed in "consensus" or business-as-usual forecastsl9. The World Energy 
Conference, meeting in late 1989 for instance, concluded that by 2020 the world would be using 75% more 
energy, and that most of it would be supplied by coal, oil and nuclear power20. 
It is not difficult to see the reasoning for such an outcome. Population growth is expected to lift global 
population levels to 7.8 billion people in. 2020 compared with 5.3 billion in 1990 (a 47% increase)2l. 
This increase, when combined with a doubling in the energy use per capita for people living in developing 
countries, and maintenance of existing per capita levels in developed countries, leads to such an answer. 
This is just one scenario, yet many other scenarios can be constructed using "reasonable" assumptions that 
lead to even greater energy needs. For instance, if the notion of equity is taken to one extreme by 
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assuming that all people in the world in 2020 enjoy a per capita energy consumption equal to that of 
developed nations today, then total primary energy supply would increase four-fold. 
What are the implications of such energy growth for the global environment if today's level of energy use, 
and mix of energy sources, is unsustainable? What are the implications for security if a substantial shift 
in the balance of world oil reserves occurs over the next two decades as a result of energy growth 
continuing at present rates? 
The Brundtland Commission and its Advisory Panel on energy concluded that the continuation of current 
growth trends will likely produce several disturbing environmental outcomes. They will: 
increase greenhouse gases and enhance the likelihood of causing climate change, 
aggravate urban-industrial air pollution, 
further acidify the environment by increasing combustion of fossil fuels, 
increase the environmental and health risks that would accompany a rapid expansion in nuclear 
energy22. 
The IPCC has added weight to these fears. Working Group 1 of the IPCC concluded that under a 
"business as usual" scenario, emissions of greenhouse gases would continue to increase, resulting in an 
estimated increase in global mean temperature during the next century of about O.3°C per decade (with 
an uncertainty range of 0.2-0.5°C per decade). This emission rate would result in a likely increase in 
global mean temperature by 2025 of about 1°C above the current mean, and increasingly rapid increases 
beyond then23. 
Such climate changes, if they came about, would put the world into a new zone of "unknowability" -that 
is we will pass beyond the sphere of human experience and hence beyond what is reasonably knowable 
about ecosystem reaction to the rapid rate of temperature change, and the absolute temperature rise24. 
Such a state would undoubtedly greatly increase the risks of unpredictable and irreversible outcomes. 
2.6 Conclusions 
The energy issue is fundamental to sustainable development. At a global level our current patterns of 
energy supply and use are unsustainable. 
Because of uncertainty, sustainability of energy is a relative, rather than an absolute, concept. Many of 
the issues described above, are not, on their own, a description of absolute unsustainability. What is now 
unsustainable is the scale of many of these activities. The global ecosystem has limits, and the scale of 
energy activities is now pressing on those limits. 
This situation can only worsen if a business-as-usual pathway to the future is followed. The business as 
usual path seems likely to exacerbate all aspects of our current unsustainable energy activities. 
Unsustainable energy use threatens the economic and political security of nations and the global 
environment. The future needs a new energy agenda. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The energy agenda - a low energy path 
"The period ahead must be regarded as transitional from an era in which energy has been 
used in an unsustainable manner". (Brundtland Report, 1987)1 
3.1 The only "realistic option" 
According to the Brundtland Commission, the key elements of sustainability that have to be reconciled 
are: 
sufficient growth of energy supplies to meet human needs, 
energy efficiency and conservation measures, such that waste of primary resources is minimised, 
public health, recognising the problems of risks to safety inherent in energy sources, 
protection of the biosphere and prevention of more localised forms of pollution. 
The Commission's investigation into a business-as-usual pathway, led them to the conclusion that such 
a pathway was simply not viable. It entailed too many risks, with the increased likelihood of widespread; 
and potentially irreversible environmental change. Greatly expanded use of nuclear power was rejected 
because it was considered there were not "solid solutions to the presently unsolved problems to which it 
gives rise"z. 
The Commission then investigated the feasibility and implications of lower energy paths. Such paths are 
neither new in concept, nor are they in the Commission's word "fanciful,,3. While considered technically 
feasible, such paths would require "fundamental political and institutional shifts,,4. But the Commission 
concluded that: 
"there is no other realistic option open to the world for the 21st century ... iI is clear that a low 
energy path is the best way towards a sustainable [uture"S. 
This conclusion has been perhaps the most far-reaching of all the recommendations made by the 
Brundtland Commission. Indeed, they were under no illusions as to its implications; it would require 
"profound structural changes in socio-economic and institutional arrangements and is an important 
challenge to global society". But they were also well aware of the significance of energy in the sustainable 
development agenda: choose an energy strategy they said, and you choose an environmental strategy. 
What are the implications of a low energy path? The Brundtland Commission pointed out that developed 
countries at present use about 70% of global primary energy production, with a per capita consumption 
some 10 times higher than in developing countries. The low energy scenario discussed in the report allows 
for increased energy use overall compared with present consumption, based on a 30% increase in primary 
energy consumption in developing countries, but a 50% fall in industrial countries6. 
These are scenarios, not predictions. But the message seems unmistakable. In order to respect 
environmental limits and achieve a more equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of energy use, 
energy systems within developed countries in particular must change substantially. 
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The strategy of a low energy path contains two essential priorities: 
1. emphasis on efficiency (both end-use and transformation), 
2. investment in, and deployment of, renewable energy technologies (the future energy base). 
3.2 Efficiency - the "cutting edge" of national energy policies 7 
There seems little doubt that from a technical standpoint, major improvements in efficiency in energy use 
worldwide can be made. Pioneering advocate of end-use efficiency Amory Lovins was making this point 
15 years ago. Since then he has been joined by many others in outlining the enormous potential for 
efficiency improvements8. 
The benefits from improving energy efficiency are wide-ranging. Improved efficiency allows the same 
energy service to be achieved from a reduced primary energy supply. This outcome offers economic 
benefits as well as environmental benefits9. Greater efficiency will also extend the life of existing fuel 
stocks and "buy time" for the necessary transition to renewable energy sources. 
In addition it has been argued that end-use planning based on energy efficiency is the key for meeting the 
basic energy needs of the world's poor. "Basic needs and much more" could be met with an energy 
requirement of about 1 kW per capita provided up-to-date energy efficient end-use technOlogies were 
used 10. This level of energy use is approximately the same as the average per capita energy consumption 
of the world's 4.1 million poor in 199011, but clearly the energy services provided would be far in excess 
of today's levels. 
An emphasis on efficiency refocuses attention on the nature of energy demand. It calls for a much closer 
matching between end-use (the task or service), the energy conversion technology (the device), and the 
energy source12• In ord~r to benefit from efficiency, appropriate technologies and conversion devices 
have to be more than just "available". They have to be deployed and used by energy consumers. But 
making substantial progress on energy efficiency is not only about technOlogies; perhaps most importantly 
it is about changing individual and collective behaviour, and reshaping institutional rigidities13. The 
energy efficiency challenge therefore encompasses all aspects of the needed transformation - values, 
institutions and technologies. 
3.3 ''1b.e cinderella options" - renewable energy 
" ... renewable energy ... should foml the foundation of the global energy structure during the 21st 
century". (Brundtland Report, 1987)14 
At present about 17% of energy consumed worldwide is from renewables (six percent hydropower and 11 % 
comprising fuelwood, crop wastes and dung)15, although much of the fuelwood can no longer be thought 
of as a renewable resource because consumption rates have overtaken sustainable yields. The potential 
for renewable energy though is very much larger. Solar energy hugely in excess of current demands is 
available for utilisation throughout the world. Solar is the ultimate sustainable energy source, with the 
virtues of continuous supply, wide geographical distribution, and low environmental impacts. 
Yet, as energy analyst Michael Grubb has observed in coining the "cinderella" tag, everyone is in favour 
of renewable energy but few take it seriously. The reasons for the low status include inadequate data, 
scepticism born of past disappointments, a failure to transfer knowledge to the policy community, and 
institutional and attitudinal barriers16. There is no doubt that some renewable technologies have given 
disappointing results, with early promise failing to be realised. Solar energy also suffers from being 
expensive to collect and store. Yet it is clear that despite very small R&D budgets in relation to other 
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energy sources, some dramatic improvements have been made in renewable technologies in the last decade. 
Costs of electricity produced by wind power, photo-voltaics and solar thermal are all on a downward 
trajectory, and further significant improvements are confidently expected17• Already, some of these 
technologies are approaching cost competitiveness with traditional energy sources. The "solar age" may 
be ready to dawn somewhat earlier than many analysts were picking just four or five years ago. 
"The speed and extent to which the large potential for renewables can be realised will depend 
on how rapidly the resulting dismissive attitudes change, and upon policy developments in 
response to this. Removing existing market obstacles, increasing R&D expenditures, and 
various forms of support including institutional reforms can all be clearly justified, and they 
could make a large impact on renewable energy developments,,18. 
3.4 The future of fossil fuels 
The Brundtland Commission described the nature of fossil fuel use in the future as the "continuing 
dilemma". Fossil fuels are at the heart of the global energy system, yet it is the combustion of fossil fuels 
that is producing many of the "unallowable harms". Despite this general understanding, traditional 
opinion still appears to be overwhelmingly of the view that conventional oil and gas resources (and a large 
part of the coal reserves) would be consumed before a major shift away from fossil fuels would occur. 
The climate change issue is forcing that assumption to be challenged. Recent analyses suggest that climate 
stabilisation requires keeping significant portions of even the world's conventional resources in the 
ground19. Environmental Editor of The Economist Frances Cairncross has come to a similar conclusion, 
noting that if global warming is to be limited then "the world simply cannot afford to burn all the fossil 
fuel now known to be economically recoverable - let alone the greater quantity that might become so,,20. 
Already, worldwide there is a clear move away from coal towards gas, largely because of its versatility and 
clean-burning characteristics. Of all the fossil fuels coal undoubtedly has the largest environmental impact. 
More than half of the S02 and 30% of N02 released into the atmosphere comes from the combustion of 
coa121. Emissions of CO2 per unit of heat produced by coal is some 60% higher than for natural gas, 
and 30% higher than for oil products, although one has to be wary of comparisons based on combustion 
alone22. 
Nevertheless, Michael Grubb has argued that natural gas makes up one of the three legs of a triad of 
responses (the other two being efficiency and renewables) that will form the pathway out of the current 
energy/environment impasse23. 
3.5 Summary 
The strategic imperatives for a sustainable energy path are clear. A sustainable energy path will be a low 
energy path. This pathway requires an orientation away from simply "supplying" energy to achieving a 
much closer matching of end-use services with energy sources. There are three strategic imperatives. First, 
a large and ongoing effort is needed to improve efficiency - both at the point of supply (transformation), 
and end-use (conversion). Second, as a transitionary measure there should be a move towards lower 
carbon, and lower polluting fossil fuels. Third, there must be a sustained effort at developing and 
deploying renewable energy technologies. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Some guidelines 
4.1 Introduction 
Times of change call for new ways of thinking and acting. The underlying issues of sustainable 
development and the reality of the process of globalisation are compelling people to seek new 
solutions to what are now widely perceived to be common problems. The implications of current 
and future energy supply and demand has become a key focus for these concerns. Indirectly, the 
issue is now being driven by concern at the prospect of global climate Change. Emissions from our 
current energy use patterns are a major contributor. 
Since early 1991 representatives from most countries in the world have been involved in negotiations 
towards a climate change convention, expected to be signed at UNCED (United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development), to be held in Brazil during June 1992. The form and content 
of this convention remain somewhat problematic however. First-world concern for climate change 
is neither unanimous, nor is it echoed by third-world countries who perceive such a convention to 
be a brake on their development ambitions. 
The climate change issue presents us with a classic individual versus commons problem. Action by 
individual countries alone will have little impact on greenhouse gas emissions and hence will do little 
to reduce the risk of climate Change. This is especially true for small or less developed countries. 
Justifiably, aU countries are concerned with the costs to their economies of taking unilateral action, 
when the benefits are both uncertain in scale and in time. Also, only a small proportion of the 
benefit will accrue to those bearing the cost. 
Co-operative action at an international level then is widely agreed to be essential to limit and 
control greenhouse gases. Nevertheless, any realistic assessment of the hope for such co-operation, 
at least in the short term, would have to be somewhat qualified. The UNCED convention may be 
signed, but true international agreement is some way off. 
Given this dilemma, how should countries be approaching the strategic imperatives for sustainable 
energy development? The follOwing points are offered as some guidelines to approach the issues -
they are not exhaustive, and need further debate and refinement. 
4.2 Clarifying what needs to be sustained 
We need to be clear about what it is we are trying to sustain. Sustainable energy development for 
instance does not mean sustaining the energy industry in its present form. Rather, it means: 
sustaining the environment, by reducing the harms from energy use to within allowable 
limits, 
sustaining essential and desirable energy services for all people now and in the future. 
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Three principles should guide decision making concerning environmental sustainability: 
waste disposal rates should not exceed the rate of (natural or managed) assimilation by the 
counterpart ecosystems, 
resource harvest rates should not exceed managed or natural regeneration rates (for 
renewable resources)!, 
the use of high quality non-renewable stocks should be depleted at rates that allow for an 
orderly transition to renewables2. 
These principles recognise that development needs to occur within environmental limits. Within 
these limits lies the priorities of meeting people's needs by sustaining energy services. The factors 
that are important in sustaining these services include: 
equity in access to energy and energy conversion technologies, 
affordability of energy and energy conversion technologies, 
continuity of energy supply. 
4.3 Develop a pathway approach 
Sustainable development is not well served by a focus on end states. End-state thinking, which relies 
on images of future technologies, is not particularly helpful because it does not help define societal 
goals and decision criteria regarding technological change, it does not facilitate and nurture the 
process of consensus formation, and (not unimportantly!) it is usually inaccurate3. What is most 
important is how to get from here to there i.e. the process. In other words it is a question of 
pathways. 
Thinking about sustainable energy development means we should be thinking in terms of pathways. 
Fundamental to pathway analysis is that they are organised around a consistent set of values and 
beliefs4• These values and beliefs set the framework and the boundaries - they do not prejudge 
outcomes (in particular, specific technologies). In other words, rejection of end-state thinking is not 
a rejection of vision - quite the contrary. 
t~ •• energy planners should not strive to solve the energy problem for all time, but, 
rather, they should pursue an evolutionary energy strategy consistent with the 
achievement of a sustainable world"s. 
Energy planning needs to be carried out within a broad strategic framework that is underpinned by 
sustainability principles. 
4.4 Adopt a precautionary approach to risk and uncertainty 
There is both scientific uncertainty about the nature of global warming, and there is also economic 
uncertainty, because we cannot be sure what the impacts will be, or how people will respond6. The 
IPCC r~port painted a fairly black and white picture of the prospects for global warming, although 
acknowledging the scientific gaps. Recent scientific findings concerning the correlation of 
temperature with sunspot activity, and the role of sulphur dioxide in contributing to increased 
cloudiness may well lend support to those who have argued that the case for global warming is far 
from proven7• Yet it does little to change the underlying concerns. Human activities are changing 
the atmosphere in ways that as yet we are unable to anticipate. Induced warming of the globe, if 
it occurs, will be irreversible, and failure to take action now will mean a bigger loss in opportunities 
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for future generations. Loading costs on to future generations is inconsistent with the requirements 
of sustainable developmentS. 
Sustainable development requires us to anticipate and prevent environmental damages. We should 
be seeking to minimise the prospects for climate change, rather than let it happen and incur the 
cost. This is the precautionary approach. 
4.5 Developed nations to give the lead 
It is widely acknowledged that developed nations must take the lead in moving the global energy 
system towards sustainability9. There is a strong moral argument for this - up until now, developed 
nations have been the main beneficiaries of fossil energy use and the main contributors to 
greenhouse gas emissions. Yet developed nations, because of their wealth and technological 
expertise, have the means to bring about change. 
To some extent this is happening already. The "activist" countries on the issue of CO2 emission 
reductions (e.g. Denmark, New Zealand, Germany, Australia, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden) . 
are all developed countries, while Norway has already offered to contribute one percent of GDP to 
a fund to support teChnology transfer to developing countries, if other developed countries would 
do the same. However, at present many of the most "developed" countries feel unable, or unwilling 
to actIO. 
The maldistrlbution in available energy services between peoples of the developed and developing 
world is clearly going to have to be faced up to. Whether we should be aiming for "equal" per 
capita energy use between the developed and developing world is fairly dubiousll. Rather there 
needs to be an awareness and commitment to closing the gap. Individual countries can no longer 
ignore the reality of the impact of their energy use on the global environment. Policies must 
consider whether the country's energy demand and level of emissions are "generalisable" to other 
countries of the world i.e. countries must consider whether what applies to them, should, on equity 
grounds, be applicable to other countries as well. It is especially important to address this question 
within a longer time perspective and to consider future energy demand and emissions, not just the 
present. 
4.6 Minimise the transference of problems 
It is self defeating if policies to reduce CO2 emissions are enacted in one country, but they result 
in CO2 emissions simply being transferred elsewhere. For instance, industries with high fossil fuel 
use may relocate offshore if too punative a carbon tax were to be imposed on them. Responses to 
transboundary pollution problems require a transboundary perspective. 
Of course, there may be other reasons, apart from minimising CO2 emissions, for countries to 
employ high fossil fuel taxes. And, if the net result is that industries do relocate offshore, there may 
still be a net reduction in emissions if more efficient energy conversion equipment is installed. 
However, the potential for transferring emissions from developed to developing countries is high, 
especially through the global linkages of transnational corporations. This problem needs to be 
recognised. 
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4.7 Look to pricing strategies 
"There is general agreement that the efficiency gains achieved by some industrialised 
countries over the past 13 years were driven largely by higher energy prices ... .it is 
doubtful whether such steady improvements can be maintained and extended if energy 
prices are held below the level needed to encourage the design and adoption of more 
energy-efficient homes, industrial processes, and transportation vehicles". (Brundtland 
Commission, 1987)12 
Environmental degradation is often portrayed as the result of market "failure" - where the cost of 
environmental externalities has not been "internalised" into the economic calculus. The 
environmental externalities of energy use are a case in point. The calls for carbon taxes are 
essentially calls for the environmental costs of energy use to become internalised in the price 
consumers pay for fossil fuels. According to theory, once energy prices reflect true environmental 
and social costs of production and use13, rational consumer choice will produce "optimum" 
outcomes. 
Already many countries impose taxes that elevate energy prices well above free market levels, and 
presumably prices energy closer to true costs. But in many countries, particularly so in developing 
countries, energy has been (and still is) regarded as an essential social service and, accordingly, 
energy supplies are subsidised. Effectively, this has isolated real cost signals from both energy 
producers and energy consumers. 
The further integration of environmental and social costs into energy pricing needs to be viewed as 
a key mechanism in purposefully working towards sustainable outcomes. This not only includes the 
level of price, but also the structure of prices (in particular for electricity). Higher energy prices of 
course have major equity implications. The raising of energy prices would need to occur in tandem 
with ensuring basic levels of income, and by providing more flexibility and cost-effectiveness in the 
provision of energy services (rather than the promotion and expansion of particular energy forms). 
Also, as discussed in the previous chapter, intrinsically associated with the question of energy price 
is that of technology change. The twin sustainable development imperatives of (1) energy efficiency 
and (2) developing a renewable energy base rest to a large degree on teChnology - discarding 
wasteful technologies, improving existing ones, and developing new ones. The whole question of 
pricing for energy must also address the necessary "technological transformation,,14. 
4.8 Recognise the requirement for active participation in energy 
Changing the path of energy development can only be achieved by the actions of people. Raising 
awareness of the issues, building commitment to change, and seeking participation of people is the 
basic starting point from which any action will stem. 
The Brundtland Commission argued that giving people an effective say over the use of resources was 
an essential element to achieving sustainable outcomes15. A decade earlier, David Orr made the 
case for participation in energy, putting forward four main propositions that participation: 
alters the outlook and behaviour of the participant and encourages awareness of the wider 
public interest, 
promotes greater equity in the distribution of costs and benefits of energy policy and 
thereby enhances social stability, 
is essential as a countervailing influence to offset elite biases, ensure accountability, and to 
prevent domination of energy policy by special interests, 
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leads to greater societal resilience, defined as the capacity to withstand disturbances16• 
As Orr has noted, however, a fundamental pre-requisite is that the quality of public knowledge 
would have to be raised somewhat above present levels of understanding. 
Another role for participation is in technology change. The participation of end users in the 
successful innovation and adoption of energy technology has been shown to be very important, but 
has so far been given little recognition17. 
4.9 Conclusions 
Times of change call for new ways of thinking. The important challenge for all countries is to 
translate the global imperatives of sustainable development into policies and actions that support 
and reinforce the national interest. Perhaps the most important thing that needs to be done in this 
respect is to broaden the meaning of "the national interest". The reality of the accelerating global 
interdependence means that old concepts of "the national interest" must change and be broadened 
to include new concepts such as the security implications of unsustainable global development. Just 
as countries in the past have invested in indigenous energy sources, partly as an insurance against 
global energy security problems, so the energy issues of tOday need to encompass ideas of national 
and international security. New "insurance pOlicies" are required. 
Moving decisively on energy and climate issues has been popularly portrayed as imposing huge costs 
on the economies of countries. Yet Professor David Pearce asserts that "the economic cost burdens 
(of climate control) are manageable provided policy is addressed in an imaginative way,,18. 
Seeking innovative and imaginative ''win-win'' solutions is a key to making progress. International 
climate conventions may be a useful lever to enable issues to be addressed that might otherwise have 
been left, but they will tend to reflect a desire for action, rather than initiate it. In the end it will 
come down to the will of individual governments to pursue: 
U... sensible energy policies in individual countries, with sound pricing and determined 
efforts to make energy markets work as efficiently as possible. It will be through the 
energy-saving technological developments that such pricing policies will encourage in 
the industrial countries. And it may be through the development of ways to draw 
energy from the sun that are cheaper and easier to apply, even in the third world, than 
a coal-fired power station 1119. 
Governments have a clear responsibility to work towards these ends. In particular they must focus 
on assisting the necessary technological transformation, and facilitating institutional change. They 
must help create the conditions so that "the right choice is the easy choice,,20. 
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SECTIONB 
The New Zealand energy scene 
This section provides a brief journey through the New 
Zealand energy scene - the evolution of energy policy over 
the last two decades, the characteristics of energy supply, 
and a description of the business-as-usual energy future that 
has recently been outlined by the energy industry. 
CHAPTERS 
The policy: three identifiable phases 
Contemporary energy policy in New Zealand has evolved through three phases in the last two 
decades. These phases can be described thus: 
Phase 1 
Phase 2 
Phase 3 
5.1 Phase 1 
up to mid-1970s 
mid-1970s to mid-1980s 
mid-1980s onwards 
Government control and responsibility, ad-hoc 
planning 
Government control with deliberate "planning" 
approach 
Diminished Government responsibility and a 
progressive move to market-based strategies 
Until the early-1970s, the widely perceived "problem" (if indeed a problem was widely perceived) 
with energy was how to ensure continued, increasing energy supply in order to accommodate 
demands that were increasing at four to five percent per annum. 
In New Zealand, we dammed our abundant rivers to produce electricity, dug coal from our extensive 
coal mines, and drilled hundreds of holes in the ground in a (largely fruitless) search to find oil -
but we found gas instead. Our inability to find oil was an inconvenience, but we were still able to 
increase our meat, wool and butter production to pay for increasing quantities of oil imported from 
the Middle East and elsewhere. Apart from the odd hiccup, it seemed to be a comfortable, non-
threatening existence. 
For successive governments, increasing energy capability and supply was regarded as an essential part 
of the development of New Zealand and accordingly regarded as a "public good". Central 
government assumed a large responsibility for the development and control of the energy business. 
The Crown of course was the owner of New Zealand's energy resources, but Crown involvement 
extended into a dominating role in the commercial exploitation of these resources, and in the 
development of the energy supply infrastructure. The energy business was also heavily regulated by 
government, with energy prices being government determined. 
State involvement was organised around a few departments that had specific responsibility for 
developing the supply of specific energy forms. The New Zealand Electricity Department supplied 
electricity and the State Coal Department supplied coal. Government became a partner in the 
development of the Maui gas field, and the State-owned Petrocorp was formed as a monopoly 
distributer of natural gas. 
Four events, all related to the demands for increased energy supply, can be identified as bringing 
Phase 1 to a close, and ending the widespread perception that the energy issue was simply one of 
supply. These were: 
the decision to raise the level of Lake Manapouri to provide electricity generation capacity, most 
of which was to be fed to a proposed aluminium smelter at Tiwai Point. The decision raised a 
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storm of public protest, and provided the first major conflict between energy supply and the 
environment, 
the discovery of, and agreement to develop, the Maui gas field. The terms of the agreement 
committed the Government to purchase gas under a "take or pay" agreement for 30 years up 
to 2008, 
the first "oil shock" in 1973 when OPEC raised the price of oil almost overnight, highlighting 
the dependency of the New Zealand economy on imported oil, 
the Electricity Plan of 1975, which included for the first time the intention to commission in 
1988 two 600 MW nuclear power plants in order to meet the expected exponential increase in 
electricity demand. The subsequent public debate through the Burns Fact Finding Group, and 
the Royal Commission on Nuclear Power substantially altered the energy planning processes of 
the time, and exposed the fallacious basis on which electricity forecasting decisions were being 
made. 
These events propelled debate on energy and energy futures into the public arena. Already in 
official circles there was some explicit recognition that the complexity of energy issues would require 
new types of response, and the fledgling Ministry of Energy Resources was formed in 1972. The end 
of Phase 1 laid the foundation for a new era in energy policy making and formulation based on 
central planning. 
5.2 Phase 2 
By 1978, the growing awareness of energy issues had seen Government responding to the need to 
clarify New Zealand's energy future. Goals and guidelines - an energy strategy for New Zealand1 was 
issued by the Minister of Energy as a public discussion document that sought to clarify goals for the 
energy sector, within a consistent framework of principles. 
The goals were to meet energy needs, promote efficient use, reduce imported oil and balance 
environmental with economic benefits. Eleven guidelines were proposed to apply to all energy 
decision making. These were: 
promote international co-operation in energy, 
promote public understanding of the issues, 
ensure efficient organisation of the energy sector, 
establish a broad social and economic context for energy, 
take a long-term view in evaluating energy projects, 
ensure effective environmental impact procedures, 
ensure high quality information is available, 
ensure energy R&D is carried out, 
develop pricing structures that promote energy conservation, 
replace oil and electricity with indigenous energy (gas and coal), 
reduce the country's dependence on oil. 
While Goals and guidelines touched a broad base of concern it nevertheless was criticised from both 
ends of the energy spectrum, especially for its generalised and at times contradictory positions. 
Nevertheless the public discussion process generated by the report was widely appreciated and 
provided a welcome catalyst for public debate on energy futures2. 
By late 1979, with a new Minister of Energy and a changed oil supply situation brought on by the 
second oil shock, the time for public debate was largely considered over - it was a time for action. 
The Minister declared firmly that "five goals have been adopted for New Zealand's energy 
strategy,,3. These goals are listed in Box 5.1: 
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These goals provided the springboard for a series of major energy decisions and investments. But 
in fact it was only the first goal that dominated the energy agenda. Expansion of the Marsden Point 
refinery, including the installation of a hydrocracker, was approved and the decision was made to 
construct a plant to produce synthetic petrol using Maui gas as the feedstock - the first such plant 
in the world. Expanded use of Maui gas became the means to achieve the drive for increased self-
sufficiency. Government accepted a major part of the investment and risk associated with these 
developments. This phase also saw the introduction by the Government of the National 
Development Act - an act designed to "fast-track" the consents procedures necessary for these 
developments to occur. 
Government involvement in energy became centralised around a much enlarged Ministry of Energy, 
encompassing operating divisions (electricity, coal, gas) and a planning division (policy and 
regulation). 
During Phase 2 energy research and development reached its peak. Again this was mainly 
government sponsored, through the New Zealand Energy Research and Development Committee 
(NZERDC), which was set up in 1974, and the Liquid Fuels Trust Board (LFTB), which was 
established in 1978 and funded by a small levy on petrol sales. 
5.3 Phase 3 
The election of the Labour Government in 1984 heralded the third phase of energy policy. This 
phase has been characterised by a fundamental change in philosophy about the role of government 
in the economy and its involvement in commercial enterprises. 
For the energy sector and energy policy it has meant: 
a separation of the State's commercial and policy arms of energy, 
a scaling down of State responsibilities for energy planning, information disclosure, participatory 
mechanisms, R&D, and investigatory work, 
the formation of commercially-driven State Owned Enterprises for electricity and coal 
(Electricorp and Coalcorp), and the privatisation of most other government-held energy 
production assets (such as Petrocorp), 
progressive moves to deregulate the energy industry, 
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disbandment of the Ministry of Energy, with the incorporation of regulatory functions and 
energy management advice under the Ministry of Commerce, 
sale of the Crown's entitlements to the remaining reserves of Maui gas in 1990 (57.2% was 
allocated to Fletcher Challenge, and 42.8% to Electricorp). 
One of the factors that drove these changes was the turnaround in world oil prices in the mid-1980s. 
The rapid decline in prices turned what was supposed to have been risk-averse energy investments 
by the Government into enormous financial liabilities. This reinforced in many people's minds the 
unsuitability of Government involving itself in the risky business of commercial energy production 
and energy planning. 
But reform of the energy sector has also been based on the assertion that there is "nothing special 
about energy".5 Treasury officials, in advocating the disbandment of the Ministry of Energy and 
Energy Management Group of the Ministry in 1988, advised the Minister of Finance that: 
"We consider that although energy is both essential and strategically important it is not 
unique in these attributes. For example, water, steel and plastic are all essential 
commodities and like energy utilised both as inputs and in their own right. Similarly butter 
access to the EEe and other trade issues are of great strategic importance',(j. 
The general thrust of this policy has continued through to the present day. Government policy 
remains focused on achieving "efficiency" and cost reductions in the energy sector. Much of the 
current debate concerns issues associated with structure, regulation, and privatisation of the 
electricity industry, based on the recommendations of the Electricity Task Force in 19897• 
5.4 SUIIUIl3lY 
Some features stand out in this brief journey through the energy policy environment of the last two 
decades. Successive governments have traditionally played a central role in the energy sector. 
Increased energy supply has been equated with increased social good, and governments took 
responsibility for the provision of this social good. This reached a peak during the middle of Phase 
2, with Government dictating almost every aspect of energy supply decisions. Since then there has 
been an enormous reversal in thinking about the role of government in all matters related to energy. 
During Phase 3, energy lost its "social good" aspect, and began to be treated as just another 
commercial product. Associated with this has been the loss of some public aspects of the energy 
infrastructure - research and development, information, and participatory mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, Government still plays a pivotal role in the sector, and many decisions related to 
ownerShip and regulation still await Government decisions. 
Throughout all phases of energy policy, the main emphasis has continued to be dominated by 
questions of supply. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The results: energy supply and demand 
6.1 Trends in supply and demand 
Demand for energy in New Zealand has continued more or less on a steady growth trajectory 
through to the present day. Although there was a levelling out (and slight decline) in energy use 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, there has been a rapid increase again since then. Total 
primary energy supply (TPES) has grown at an average of 0.35 million tonnes of oil equivalents 
(Mtoe)l per annum from 1960 to 1989 (representing an average growth of 5.5% per annum through 
to 1974, and three percent from 1975 through to 1989) (Figure 6.1). 
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New Zealand primary energy requirement by energy form, 1960-89 (Mtoe)2. 
The rise in TPES over the last two decades has reflected increases in both transformation losses and 
total final energy consumption TFEC3 (Figure 6.2). Losses have more than doubled over the last 
two decades due to increased thermal generation of electricity (both fossil fuel and geothermal), and 
the production of synthetic petrol. For electricity, these losses accounted for 51% of the energy 
value of primary inputs in 1988, mostly due to losses at thermal power stations. For liquid fuels, 
losses accounted for 34% of the energy value of the primary energy inputs due to losses at the 
Marsden Point oil refinery (transforming crude oil into fuels) and the Motonui synthetic petrol plant 
(transforming natural gas to methanol and then petrol). Providing coal and gas in final consumer 
form entails low losses of typically one to five percent (Figure 6.3). In 1989, losses accounted for 
25% ofTPES. 
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Breakdown of TPES into energy transformation losses and 1FEC 1970-89 (1989 
data provisional)4. 
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PrimaJ:y energy supply compared with final energy consumption for the four major 
energy forms (1988 calender year)5. 
What has been driving the steady increase in final energy consumption? Figure 6.4 shows the trends 
for the last two decades broken down into various sectoral categories. The main sectors of growth 
have been industry (150% increase in demand), and transport (75% increase in demand). These two 
sectors alone now account for 75% of TFEC. 
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Demand growth has been driven by an increasing population (42% increase in population in the 
three decades since 1960), and increased per capita energy demand. Indeed, per capita final energy 
consumption has shown a consistent, rising trend over the last three decades, and has doubled since 
1960 (Figure 6.5). These trends reflect a general shift towards a higher energy intensiveness of our 
industrial base and our transport system. 
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Over this period there has been a change in the mix of energy sources. The relative importance of 
coal has declined consistently, while natural gas has increased market share considerably since first 
becoming available in the late 1960s. The availability of natural gas (and indigenous oil) has also 
brought about a decline in the relative importance of imported oil. In 1974,58% of primary energy 
was supplied by imported oil, while by the late 1980s this contribution had declined to about 20% 
(indicating that New Zealand had achieved some 80% self sufficiency in energy). Nevertheless, the 
proportion of energy supplied by fossil fuels (oil, coal and natural gas) has remained consistent at 
about 80-85% throughout the last three decades. 
6.2 Greenhouse gas impact 
Recent calculations indicate energy production and use contribute approximately 36% of New 
Zealand's greenhouse gas impact8. Ninety percent of this is from carbon dioxide and 10% from 
methane and nitrous oxides. This contribution from energy to total greenhouse emissions is a 
somewhat lower proportion than most other developed countries, largely because New Zealand's 
livestock systems are believed to be major contributers to greenhouse gas emissions through methane 
and nitrous oxides. 
Figure 6.6 shows the energy-related CO2 emissions by energy source. The CO2 emissions are a 
function of the primary supply of fossil fuels, and so reflect end-use consumption characteristics and 
transformation losses. Emissions have been increasing at an average of three percent per annum 
since 1960. From 1980 to 1988, CO2 emissions increased by over 50% i.e. an average increase of 
over five percent per annum. 
Figure 6.6 
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Distn"bution of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions by energy source (showing 
also the proportion of CO2 emissions from synthetic petrol and electricity 
generation)9. 
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6.3 Summary 
Over the last three decades a number of dominant trends in energy supply, demand and CO2 impact 
have emerged. These are: 
energy demand increasing at a steady rate due mainly to increased industrial demand and 
transport, 
energy demand increasing as a result of both increasing population size and increasing per 
capita consumption, 
a steady increase in energy transformation losses, 
a steady rising trend in CO2 emissions, 
a continued heavy reliance on fossil fuels. 
Are these trends our destiny? How will these trends translate into future energy demands and 
impacts? The implications of following a "business-as-usual" trend to the future are discussed in 
the following chapter. 
Notes and references 
1. The International Energy Agency (lEA) uses these units as a standard in order to derive some equivalence in the 
treatment of energy sources between countries. Note however that the lEA has recently modified its energy balance 
methodology to represent more accurately a physical energy supply and to align the treatment of hydro and geothermal 
electricity with conventions used elsewhere. Hydro-electricity is now converted to oil equivalents based on the energy 
content of the electricity generated (i.e. 100% efficiency assumed), while electricity generated from geothermal plant is 
now converted to oil equivalents based on an assumed 10% transformation efficiency. For New Zealand this has had 
the effect of substantially reducing the "losses" component of TPES, since hydro electricity was formerly given the 
equivalence of fossil-fuelled thermal generation plant and ranked at only 33% efficiency. Source: lEA, 1991. Quarterly 
oil statistics and energy balances - first quarter 1991. lEA, Paris. 
2. Source: Bertram, G. 1990. Energy intensity in New Zealand: a working paper. Victoria University, Wellington. 37p; 
modified to account for revised energy transformation losses discussed above in Endnote 1. 
3. TPES can be considered as the gross energy supply and TFEC the net energy consumption: the difference between the 
two measures is accounted for by transformation losses, which are the losses incurred in transforming primary energy 
into a final consumer form (e.g. gas to electricity). 
4. Derived from: Bertram, Energy intensity, op. cit.; Electricity Corporation of New Zealand, 1991. Annual Report 31 
March 1991. Wellington. 
5. Derived from Dang, H.D.T. and Ling, AK.C. 1989. Energy data file June 1989. Ministry of Energy, Wellington. 77p. 
6. Source: Bertram, Energy intensity, op. cit. 
7. Source: Ibid., and population data from Department of Statistics information. 
8. From data given in Turbott, c., Pool, F. and Vickers, G. 1991. Energy management and the greenhouse effect. Ministry 
of Commerce, Wellington. 69p. 
9. Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The future: business as usual? 
7.1 Introduction 
New Zealand's energy future used to be forecast by the Ministry of Energy and published in the 
annual Energy Plan1. These documents reported on forecasting exercises of energy demand and 
supply for periods up to 20 years. Energy Plans were abandoned during the early part of Phase 3, 
and since then industry-wide forecasts of future demand and supply have been irregular. Energy 88 
was the last effort carried out by the Ministry of Energy before it was disbanded, and refresented 
an heroic effort on the part of the author in the face of declining Government interest. As the 
Minister of Energy clearly indicated in the Foreward to Energy 88, its purpose was simply as an 
information source to guide the players in the energy market3. 
Energy 88 represented the last word on energy planning and forecasting from Government until 
August 1991. The Ministry of Commerce (with the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research) 
then published an energy forecast based on econometric modelling through to the year 2000, based 
essentially on "business-as-usual" assumptions4. 
In September 1991, The Energy Foundation (comprising the major players in the energy supply 
industry) published its first forecast of supply and demand from 1991 through to 20105. This 
forecast was based on a Delphi survey of representatives of the established energy industry, again 
assuming a "business-as-usual" environment. 
For this study, a business-as-usual pathway was developed through to the year 2020. It was carried 
out prior to the release of the Energy Foundation study, and so contains some different assumptions 
concerning sources of energy supply. Nevertheless, the energy demand outcomes of the two forecasts 
are very similar. 
7.2 The business-as-usual path 
The business-as-usual pathway follows current energy supply trends, using projections of demand 
through to the year 2000 published by the IEA6 (growing at an average of two percent per annum), 
with an assumption of slower rates of energy growth through to 2020 (averaging 1.1 % per annum) 
(Figure 7.1). 
Maui gas production peaks between 1995 and 2000, and then declines, with production from known 
new reserves of gas providing continued, but diminishing, supply from then on. Declining 
indigenous oil supplies from the mid 1990s, coupled with a steadily increasing demand for oil 
products of about 1.5% per annum will require steadily increasing oil imports. 
The business-as-usual pathway is based on a large increase in the use of coal (and lignite) in the 
post-Maui era. Coal again becomes a major energy solirce in the economy, being utilised 
particularly for a range of energy transformation processes - conversions through to methanol or 
petrol, and electricity. Coal production would increase fourfold by 2020. 
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Figure 7.1 Business-as-usual pathway of total primary energy supply (TPES). 
Meanwhile, hydro and geothermal electricity production would increase by about 45%. This would 
necessitate investment in several major hydro-electric projects such as the Lower and Upper Clutha 
schemes, and the Lower Waitaki scheme, as well as local schemes on smaller rivers and catchments. 
Even with these developments, further energy sources will be required from about 2005 onwards to 
fill a small, but growing, energy "gap". This may mean more oil and gas (e.g. LNG could be 
imported), renewables (solar, biomass) or nuclear power. 
The other features of this pathway are: 
TPES would increase by 53% over the next three decades, with the increase in TFEC (48%) 
being slightly lower because of higher transformation losses in the energy system, 
population growth is assumed to increase by 17% through to 2020, based on a series of 
"medium" population projections7. Therefore, per capita final energy consumption would 
increase by just 26% over the period. Most of this growth would be in the first 20 years 
(following the current trajectory of increasing per capita consumption), with per capita 
consumption levelling out from about 2010 onwards, 
much of the increase would reflect the continued growth in energy-intensive forestry 
industries (but no major expansion of the metals industry), as well as other increased 
economic activity such as tourism that entails high demands for transport fuel. Indeed, it 
is anticipated that the business-as-usual pathway would entail a modest level of efficiency 
measures being adopted. 
However, the environmental implications of the business-as-usual path would be considerable. The 
greatly increased coal production implies large land and water impacts due to mining activities. 
Meanwhile, CO2 emissions would increase markedly. Instead of heading towards the government 
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target of a 20% decrease in CO2 emissions by the year 2000, emissions would increase by about 25%. 
By the year 2020, they would be 58% above 1990 levels. 
7.3 Discussion 
The business-as-usual pathway is consistent with many of the predictions being made by players in 
the energy industry, in particular it is consistent with predictions made for the post-Maui era. 
Indeed it is somewhat more conservative than many. For instance, Barry Leay from the Electricity 
Supply Association of New Zealand is reported as suggesting that electricity demand will increase 
from the present 30,000 kWh to 51,000 kWh by 2006 (68% increase), and that coal-fired power 
stations would provide a substantial base for that8. Similar sentiments have been expressed by the 
coal industry. Industry personnel have recently outlined a coal-based future for the post-Maui era 
that will provide replacement feedstock for thermal power stations and for the Motonui synfuels 
plant9. On the question of future transport fuels, much investigatory work was undertaken in the 
early 1980s by the Liquid Fuels Trust Board (LFTB) into the use of lignite as the raw energy source 
to provide indigenous transport fuelslO. As has recently been pointed out, lignite is still very much 
sitting waiting "on the back burner" 11. So while the pathway cannot account for the almost 
certain occurrence of the unexpected, it seems a reasonable interpretation of one particular 
perspective of the future. 
Clearly there is much speculation involved here because there is considerable uncertainty about 
sources of supply in the post-Maui era. But despite some different assumptions about sources of 
supply12, the business-as-usual pathway is consistent in direction with the Energy Foundation's 
forecast of energy demand, and matches the prediction of CO2 emissions very closely. For instance, 
the Energy Foundation forecasts a 23% increase in CO2 levels by 2000, and an approximately 40% 
increase by 2010 - almost exactly the same as this study. 
7.4 Conclusions 
The business-as-usual pathway outlined here is consistent in direction with other recent 
"business-as-usual" forecasts of future energy demand. Yet, given the principles of sustainable 
development outlined in Section A, this pathway seems to be taking us in very much the wrong 
direction. Energy demand continues to increase, and the reliance on fossil fuels continues at much 
the same level as tOday. 
There is much uncertainty about the supply of fossil fuels in the post-Maui era. But in the absence 
of finding a substantial oil field in the next decade, the options are to greatly increase imports of 
oil, or to embark upon another indigenous liquid fuels programme, possibly based on lignite as 
feedstock. 
Either way, CO2 emissions continue to increase and become increasingly out of control. A large 
penalty is paid for the high transformation losses incurred in converting less preferable types of fossil 
fuels into electricity and liquid fuels. In the words used in Chapter 4, such a policy becomes 
increasingly "non-generalisable". In short, the business-as-usual pathway becomes increasingly 
unsustainable. We need a different pathway. 
Notes and references 
1. The first Energy Plan was published in 1980. See: Ministry of Energy. 1980. 1980 Energy Plan. Government 
Printer, Wellington. 75p. 
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2. Wyatt, N.S. (Ed.) 1988. Energy 88. Ministry of Energy, Wellington. 48p. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ellis, J., Howard, A, Mayes, K., Otang, B., Tan, L., Clough, P., Culy, J. and Gale, S. 1991. Energy demand 
forecasts - some initial results. Ministry of Commerce and the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, 
Wellington. 77p. 
5. The Energy Foundation, 1991. New Zealand energy supply and demand forecast. Wellington. 16p. Note that the 
Energy Foundation was formed in large part to fill the gap caused by the demise of the energy planning and 
information function of Government. 
6. lEA, 1990. Review of lEA country energy policies. International Energy Agency, Paris. 
7. This is based on the Department of Statistics' population projection known as "Series 8", which assumes "medium" 
fertility, "medium" mortality rate, and a long term net annual migration of zero. 
8. Reported in: Environment and Conservation Organisations. 1991. Eco newsletter (June 1991): 8-9. 
9. Whitney, R. 1991. Thermal power for the future. Coal Research Newsletter (No.2, 1991). p.3. See also: Third, 
J. 1991. Coal in the gas hole. Terra Nova 10: 44-45. 
10. Liquid Fuels Trust Board, 1981. Annual Report to Parliament, 1980-81. Wellington. 
11. Wright, J. and Baines, J. 1990. Transport fuels in New Zealand after Maui - lignite on the back burner. 
lnfomwtion Paper No. 19. Centre for Resource Management, Lincoln University and University of Canterbury. 
28p_ 
12. The Energy Foundation study presented several alternative generation options to fill the future electricity "gap". 
Using coal in thermal stations was presented as the most likely option. They also assumed that there would be no 
new indigenous synthetic fuel production facility taking over from Motonui, and that imported oil would make up 
the shortfall. This is arguable. It is highly probable that a strong case would be made on political and security 
grounds to continue with a reasonable level of indigenous transport fuel production. Regardless of these 
assumptions though, the CO2 implications are very similar. 
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SECTIONC 
Moving to a sustainable energy pathway 
This section brings the strategic imperatives of sustainable 
development to bear on New Zealand's energy future. It is 
an exploration of the options, road blocks, and 
opportunities for developing our energy system along an 
alternative route to business-as-usual - to develop it along 
a sustainable energy pathway. 
CHAPTER 8 
Envisioning a different direction ... sustainability 
8.1 Introduction 
An alternative "sustainable energy,,1 path is outlined in this chapter. The purpose of this exercise 
is illustrative, not predictive. It is to illustrate options and possibilities for energy supply, assuming 
that a process of transformation evolves in the way energy is supplied and used. It is also to 
illustrate the contrasting outcomes between the business-as-usual and sustainability pathways. 
An important basic premise of this comparison is that the level of energy end-use services provided 
by each pathway is comparable. In other words the sustainable energy pathway does not limit 
economic opportunities by placing restrictions on energy supply, although this does not mean that 
the structure of the economy would be the same for each path. Rather, the potential for carrying 
out the same level of activities from the energy system would be similar. 
8.2 Sustainable energy path 
The sustainable energy path presented here represents one view of the way in which a low energy 
path could develop. The pathway is underpinned by two fundamental principles - a commitment to 
progressively improve energy efficiency (both in the supply and consumption of energy), and a 
commitment to invest in, and deplOY, renewable energy sources. Under this pathway TPES would 
peak at around the year 2000, and gradually decline after that (Figure 8.1). By 2020, TPES would 
be only two-thirds of the level required by business-as-usual. 
Fossil fuel use would peak around 1995 and decline rapidly from 2010 onwards. On-going efforts 
to improve end-use efficiency would extend the life of existing gas reserves and provide a longer 
"bridging" period for the uptake of renewables. 
Hydro electricity production would increase only modestly, while geothermal production would 
increase depending on field capabilities. It is anticipated that coal would continue to play an 
important although declining role as a source of relatively cheap energy for bulk heating. 
The pathway requires energy suppliers to begin orientating themselves towards new;technology solar-
based energy sources during the 1990s. Investment in R&D, but more particularly investment in 
gaining operational experience with the technologies, would start to pay dividends from about 2005 
onwards, with solar energy taking over from declining supplies of oil and gas. 
The other features of this pathway are that: 
there would be a phased, but substantial, reduction in energy transformation and distribution 
losses, due to the gradual phase out of fossil fuel thermal electricity generation, the synfuels 
plant, and an emphasis on improving distribution efficiency, 
primary energy supply per capita would decline by 23% over the period but, because of 
improved transformation efficiency, per capita final energy consumption would actually rise 
slightly over the next few years as the economy expanded, dropping away gradually as end-use 
efficiency measures become more widely adopted and as future economic growth becomes less 
energy intensive, 
41 
25 ! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
20~ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
'i' 15l g 
~ 
'-' 
I 
! 
rJ) I i LU I 
a. 10~ I-
Figure 8.1 
1 
Year 
I««\j 
Solar 
Hydro & Geo 
I! 
-' -' 
Oil & Gas 
C2ZJ 
Coal 
"Sustainable energy" pathway of TPES (based on actual demand up to 1990 and 
author's calculations through to 2020). 
end-use efficiency would need to improve at an average of approximately one percent per year 
compared to the business-as-usual pathway. This would seem to be an achievable target given 
the potential for efficiency improvements that have been claimed by some recent studies2, 
the breakdown of end-use demands are somewhat speculative, but comparisons of the two 
pathways are shown in Figures 8.2 and 8.3. Transport demands continue to increase in the 
sustainable energy path through until near the end of this decade before levelling off. It is 
assumed that it will be particularly difficult to stabilise energy use in the transport sector in the 
short term, as there appears to be significant momentum behind increasing transport demands 
in the short term. Nevertheless, there would be a concerted effort to utilise fuels such as CNG. 
8.3 Impact of sustainable energy pathway on carbon dioxide reduction targets 
And what of the CO2 implications? Emissions of CO2 in the year 2000 would be on a par with 
existing levels, but would have stabilised and started on a declining trend. By 2005, there would be 
a five percent reduction (14% per capita), by 2010 a 16% reduction, and by 2020 a 51 % reduction 
(Figure 8.4). The key to the rapid decline in CO2 emissions after 2010 is the availability and uptake 
of appropriate, renewable technologies. 
42 
25 
20-
Q) 15-0 
..... 
6 
(/) 
LU 
a. 10-I-
o 
Figure 8.2 
25 
20-
5-
Figure 8.3 
; .. : ..... 1//.>.>": I.':' .. 
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 
Year 
End-use breakdown of TPES for business-as-usual path. 
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 
Year 
End-use breakdown of TPES for sustainable energy path. 
, 
I 
:~ 
Losses 
!~ 
Other 
Q 
Industry 
i , 
Transport 
rLZJ 
Residential 
Losses 
~ 
: Other 
:d 
. Industry 
Transport 
Residential 
Thus, under the assumptions used in this pathway, the country would not achieve the Government's 
target of a 20% CO2 cut by 2000. While it could be argued that the assumptions used here have 
been somewhat conservative, the pathway contains an essential message. Perhaps it is less important 
to achieve this specific target than it is to be well on the pathway to achieving significant and 
permanent cuts in CO2 emissions early next century. As Figure 8.4 shows, the real gains from this 
particular pathway occur after the year 2000. By 2020, both total CO2 emissions and emissions per 
capita would be less than one-half of current CO2 levels, and less than one-third of those for the 
continuation path. 
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8.4 Conclusions 
A pathway based on applying the principles of sustainability produces a similar level of energy 
services to business-as-usual, but is vastly different in terms of the level and sources of energy supply, 
and the environmental impact. The sustainable energy pathway developed here provides a different 
route to a different future. The pathway reduces dependence on fossil fuels, brings CO2 emissions 
under control, and provides for significant and accelerating reductions from 2005 onwards. 
Nevertheless, it is important not to get caught up in end-state thinking. This is just one particular 
interpretation of "sustainability" within which to frame present actions. We must concentrate on 
the process. We need to address many questions about feasibility, and means. A key aspect is the 
presumption that new-technology solar-based energy sources could provide a rapidly increasing 
proportion of New Zealand's primary energy supply early next century. Is such an assumption 
fanciful? The prospects are discussed further in the following chapter and in Chapter 12. 
Notes and references 
1. There is; some difficulty in giving any pathway a "sustainability" label. What is sustainable? No doubt some people will 
find some of the assumptions built into this pathway to be "unsustainable", especially because end-uses have not been 
scrutinised with respect to sources of supply, and end-use demands are forecast to increase. This is a valid criticism. 
More work is needed. However, it is important to note that the pathway is indicative only and, because of the terms 
of reference of the study, is "supply" oriented. 
2. The Energy Management Group from the Ministry of Commerce recently concluded that the feasible energy savings due 
to efficiency improvements across the commercial, domestic and industrial sectors up to the year 2005 was typically 25-
30%. A reduction in car fuel use of 45% by 2005 was considered technically feasible mainly through improved energy 
efficienc:y,' of new vehicles (Turbott, C., Pool, F. and Vickers, G. 1991. Energj management and the greenhouse effect. 
Ministty, (i)f Commerce, Wellington. 69p.). An analysis carried out by Electricorp indicated the technical feasibility of 
saving 57:% of total electricity consumption by end-use efficiency, although they considered that a 20% saving would be 
more r€3listic in practice (Cameron, L. 1989. Potential savings in electricity consumption through increased electricity 
efficiency lin New Zealand. Electricorp, Wellington). 
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CHAPTER 9 
A solar future: fiction or reality? 
9.1 Introduction 
The presumption that renewable energy would provide the future energy base is not new. As was 
discussed in Chapter 5 the move to a renewable energy base in the "long term" was acknowledged 
by Government as a major policy goal back in the late 1970s. Initially, Maui gas was seen as the 
"bridge" to a more sustainable energy future based on renewable energy!. More recently the Coal 
Corporation has acknowledged that renewable energy is the logical long-term energy source2. 
Therefore it seems to be not so much a question of "if', but "when". For those with a vested 
interest in maintaining the status quo, the role of renewables continues to be cast in the long-term -
they are always somewhere beyond the short-term horizon. But the available evidence is beginning 
to show otherwise. Several renewable energy technologies are beginning to bridge this long-term 
barrier, and are becoming viable. 
9.2 What is the state of solar technologies? 
It is the solar to electricity conversion technologies where the rate of advance in solar technologies 
during the 1980s has been most impressive. A combination of research and development, field 
experience and mass production of componentry has led to both an improvement in efficiency, and 
two to threefold reductions in real costs per kWh during the last decade. Wind energy and 
photovoltaics systems (PV) are both on development pathways that suggest further significant cost 
reductions over the coming decades. 
For instance, during the 1980s the cost of wind energy in the US was reduced by 70% and is now 
6-8 c/kWh (cf. electricity from coal-fired plants at about 6 c/kWh)3. Carl Weinberg and Robert 
Williams, writing in Scientific American last year, noted that most of the cost reduction seen in the 
last decade has come from "organisational learning", such as learned techniques of mass-production, 
more effective machine siting and more rigorous maintenance schedules, rather than technolOgy 
breakthroughs4. Incremental technology improvements have centred on lightweight composite-
material blades, and microprocessor-controlled turbines. Further cost reductions are confidently 
predicted. For inst~nce projections made~ the US Department of Energy estimate that costs could 
fall to 3.5 c/kWh during the next 20 years. . . 
Advances in photovoltaics have been even more spectacular. But, unlike wind, this progress has 
been due almost entirely to technological breakthroughs as a result of ongoing R&D effort6. Most 
of the effort has concentrated on improving energy conversion efficiencies, which are now around 
10% for commercially available PV systems, and over 30% for laboratory prototypes 7. Costs that 
were around $60 per kWh in 1970 have declined to 20-30 c/kWh todal. Cost reductions to 
10 c/kWh (US) by the end of the decade seem possible, with further reductions likely9. 
The costs of another new technology, solar thermal electricity, has rapidly declined throughout the 
1980s, although its application has been more confined to deserts and other areas of high solar 
radiation flux. Solar-thermal systems are now operating at up to 22% conversion efficiencylO. 
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The actual and projected cost reductions in electricity from solar technOlogies are summarised in 
Box 9.1. Such progress provides grounds for optimism that solar technologies could provide 
economically competitive supplies of energy early next decade, or even before then. Indeed, the 
senior Vice President of California's Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the largest utility in the US) 
is quoted as saying: 
"many renewable-generation options are technically feasible today, and with encouragement can 
prove to be fully cost competitive ... within 10 years"ll. 
'9.3 Where are the initiatives roming from? 
The solar industry overseas has developed through government assistance programmes that have 
supported R&D and assisted with the deployment of technologies into the existing energy supply 
system. At present a handful of countries are leading the technological and commercial advances 
,of solar energy for electricity, but the list is growing. The current state of play for wind and PV 
technologies is summarised briefly below: 
,W'1IJd 
!In the US, most initiatives have been in California. Several wind farms were established during the 
1980s with the assistance of Federal and State tax credits. This programme not only boosted a local 
manufacturing industry, but also provided a market for British and Danish manufacturers who set 
up wind farms. Federal government assistance for R&D programmes has also been a factor. New 
development has slowed since the incentives have been discontinued, but R&D programmes are 
continuing., 
In Britain, the wind industry has several manufacturers providing a range of turbine sizes and 
configurations. Government supports an ongoing R&D programme. 
The Netherlands Government provided a major assistance package to the Dutch wind turbine 
industry ill 1986 for both technology development, and market subsidies to encourage deployment. 
The aim was: to develop the Dutch industry and enhance its ability to penetrate the market for large 
wind turbines both in the Netherlands and abroad12. The Netherlands plans to have 150 MW 
capacity by 1992 and 1000 MW by the year 200013. 
In Denman,. the official goal is that wind power should contribute 10% of electricity by the 
year 2000. The industry enjoys a level of direct government support, as well as a programme that 
obliges utility companies to build 100 MW of wind power before 199114. The Danish industry is 
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also widely supported by private investors - indeed six percent of Danes now own shares in wind 
turbines15. Danish wind turbines have been exported to both the US and India. 
Many other countries are also embarking on wind energy programmes, including West Germany, 
China and India - the Indian programme is particularly ambitious. 
Photovoltaics 
Until the mid-1980s the US was the dominant player in the PV business. The Federal Government 
has continued to support the industry through the National Photovoltaic Program, an R&D effort 
that collaborates closely with industry16. 
Now, the Japanese, German and Italian Governments are strong supporters of R&D in PV, and US 
firms have lost a large part of their previous dominant market share as these countries have invested 
in manufacturing capacity. Australia is also at the forefront of silicon solar cell research, and also 
has a substantial manufacturing capacity. The federal government has recently established the 
Centre for Photovoltaic Devices and Systems at the University of New South Wales in order to 
enhance Australia's leading position17. State electricity utilities are also involved in this 
programme. 
9.4 Watching the way the world is going 
The discussion above emphasises technologies that provide direct conversion of solar energy to 
electricity. It is a reflection of international trends. In most countries, electricity consumption as 
a proportion of total final energy consumption has continued to increase over the last few decades. 
In the future, increased requirements for electricity seem likely, especially if the direction of 
technology change in energy systems for transport continues on its present path. In some countries, 
hydrogen is being looked upon as the fuel of the future because it produces no CO2 during 
combustion, and has very low levels of harmful emissions. However, hydrogen production requires 
electricity to split the water molecule, so without a cheap source of electricity the process is 
expensive. Germany currently leads the effort to develop solar-hydrogen systems, using electricity 
from photovoltaic cells18. Meanwhile electric vehicle development and production is now a 
priority for several major vehicle manufacturers. Much of this activity is being driven by the 
regulatory requirement passed in California last year specifying two percent of car sales by 1998, and 
10% by 2003, be "zero emission" vehicles. With California being such an important vehicle market, 
the effect on the auto industry will likely be ground-breaking. Already some commercial models are 
available, and these are certain to increase as further progress with battery storage systems occurs. 
In New Zealand we have tended to look towards biomass as the major renewable (solar-based) 
energy resource for the future. Early work focused on alcohol production from crops but the net 
energy yield was never very high, while the land requirements were high. More recently wood has 
been considered for a range of applications: direct combustion, transformation to electricity, 
gasification and alcohol production. New Zealand, with its favourable climate and land-based 
heritage seems to be particularly well placed to utilise biomass, but apart from the use of wood 
wastes, prospects are still uncertain. At an international level, widespread use of biomass for liquid 
fuel production is no longer considered feasible because of competing demands for wood and land. 
There are also considerable environmental impacts from intensive energy cropping. And despite 
some advantages (such as energy storage ability), biological systems are stuck with the reality of low 
conversion efficiencies in turning sunlight energy into biomass - typically about one percent. Direct 
conversion systems are now achieving considerably better than this. 
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Direct conversion systems are likely to be dominant solar technologies of the future. But electricity 
generation represents just one application. Typically about one-third of the energy required in 
developed countries is for low-grade heat, and solar energy is especially well suited to supplying this 
through either passive or active heating systems. 
95 Summary 
Despite very low R&D expenditures in relation to other energy sources, several solar-based 
renewable technologies have advanced over the last decade to the point that they are approaching 
cost competitiveness with conventional energy sources. The most important advances are with direct 
solar to electricity systems. 
Several countries have recognised the opportunity that these energy technologies present, not only 
to supply energy to meet local needs, but to capitalise on the strong expectation of a rapidly growing 
international market in solar technologies. These countries vary markedly in terms of size and state 
of development, but they all have one thing in common - a programme of targeted government 
investment in the industry through R&D and/or market-based deployment assistance. 
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CHAPTER 10 
Setting out on the pathway: lessons from the past 
10.1 Introduction 
To the casual observer it might appear that we have started down the sustainable energy pathway 
before. Indeed, it is remarkable to look back at the energy goals and guidelines developed in the 
late 1970s, and to see the striking similarity with the concepts and principles being discussed now 
under the guise of sustainabilityl. The two key strategic imperatives of a sustainability path 
(efficiency and renewables) were both recognised as two of the five goals for New Zealand's energy 
strategy in 1979. Other important principles such as having in place an energy planning framework, 
participatory processes, and pricing structures that encourage efficiency were all recognised. 
Yet by many measures, New Zealand's energy system is less sustainable now than it was during the 
late 1970s. Primary energy consumption is over 50% higher, and the environmental impacts of our 
energy use have increased similarly. Our reliance on non-renewable energy resources has increased 
while, according to some analysts, New Zealand's energy efficiency has declined over the last decade. 
All of these are reversals of what were set out as goals and guidelines in the late 1970s. So what 
happened to derail these good intentions? 
The outcomes have to be seen within the context of the time. The late 1970s and early 1980s 
represented the peak of Phase 2 energy policy making, and the peak of government involvement. 
Two issues drove the decision-making process: the debate about what to do with Maui gas, and the 
events following the second oil shock in early 1979. 
10.2 How to use the gas up "fast enough" 
Initially it had been planned to use Maui gas for electricity generation, but when electricity demand 
forecasts in the mid 1970s were shown to be wildly over-estimated, new uses for the gas were sought 
with some urgency. In November 1978 the then Minister of Energy (Mr Gair) set up the Liquid 
Fuels Trust Board (LFTB), who were given until September the following year to come up with 
recommendations on the best ways to use natural gas to reduce New Zealand's dependence on 
imported oil for transport fuels. These recommendations needed to be integrated with the expansion 
plans for the Marsden Point refinery. Decisions on the expansion had been delayed for many years 
but were now considered a high priority2. The specific details of the expansion depended on 
decisions taken on the indigenous fuels programme. The two initiatives were locked together. 
The first delivery of Maui gas was due in 1978, and the "take-or-pay" contract meant that the 
Government would be paying for increasing quantities of Maui gas, regardless of whether there was 
a use. The take or pay agreement was not the only pressure however. In addition, the Joint 
Venture Agreement set an obligation for the joint venturers to act "for the maximum commercial 
advantage of the joint venture,,3. Since condensate was the most valuable product from the Maui 
field, and condensate volumes were proportional to gas draw-off volumes, maintaining high 
condensate flows was central to fulfilling this obligation. Overall, the effect of the take or pay 
agreement, in concert with the agreement to maximise commercial gain, was to create, in the words 
of one analyst, a "depletion mentality,,4. According to the Chairman of the LFTB, Dr Colin 
Maiden, there was an imperative to find options that could use the gas "fast enough"S. 
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10.3 The second oil shock 
The second oil shock in early 1979 threw New Zealand into something of a panic. Almost 
overnight, oil production from Iran was cut by half. At that time Iran supplied 40% of New 
Zealand's crude oil. By June, physical restrictions on the consumption of avgas and diesel were 
being enforced and quota systems were introduced. Carless days followed, and petrol sales during 
weekends were prohibited. Throughout this time there was the definite air of a seige mentality. 
It soon became a dominant belief that the world oil market would become terminally unstable, and 
that oil prices were on a permanent upward climb. Delphi surveys of "experts" were carried out by 
the Ministry of Energy to forecast future oil prices, and from mid 1979 to early 1981 these people 
were forecasting steadily rising prices through to 1995-966. Substantial actual price rises over that 
time also added to this view. The public's mind was thus reinforced and this dominant belief drove 
the energy decision-making process. Oil prices would continue onwards and upwards! 
The second oil shock also put pressure on the country's balance of payments. Wheras prior to the 
first oil shock, oil imports were equivalent to about six percent of agricultural export earnings, by 
1980 this proportion had risen to 27%7. 
The coincidence of all these events led to rapid action. Decisions on several major energy projects 
were made within a short time period. The oil refinery expansion was approved in November 1979, 
and a memorandum of understanding was signed in April 1980 between the Government and Mobil 
Oil for the joint development of the synfuels plant at Motonui8. Meanwhile the National 
Development Act had been passed through Parliament in late 1979 in order to streamline the 
planning procedures, and reduce delays in obtaining consents and approvals for the projects. 
10.4 Goals become guidelines .... and guidelines disappear 
The goals and guidelines exercise established a participatory, multi-objective path for an energy 
strategy. But within the space of a few months, most of these goals had been subsumed by just a 
single objective. In proceeding with the liquid fuels "package", several of the goals set only months 
earlier by the Energy Strategy '79 exercise were contravened. In particular, the goal "to ensure that 
energy is used efficient~" was seriously compromised by the decision to transform gas into petrol 
with a 50% energy loss . 
Subsequently, once the substantive decisions on the liquid fuels programme had been made, subtle 
(and not so subtle) changes in New Zealand's energy goals began to appear. Several new, or 
changed, energy goals appeared in the 1980 Energy Plan, only months after the goal-setting strategy 
of Energy Strategy '79. Goal 1 (to reduce dependence on imported oil) was expanded to include 
" ... by the progressive implementation of substitution measures selected to minimise increases in the 
cost of energy supply". Wording on Goal 2 had been changed so that rather than the specific 
objective of increasing diversity of supply, it would now just be encouraged. Reference to using 
appropriate energy types to ensure efficiency (Goal 3) was dropped in preference to "employment 
of appropriate energy utilisation systems". Goal 4 was changed from a purposeful objective of 
transferring energy supply from non renewables to renewables to read: "to promote the preferential 
use of renewable rather than non renewable resources in energy supply where this can be achieved 
without significantly increasing the cost of supply". Goal 5 (establishing an energy planning 
framework) emerged unscathed. Two new goals were also outlined: (1) "to promote the formulation 
and implementation of a stable energy pricing policy"; and (2) "to promote the effective and 
economic utilisation of indigenous energy resources which contribute to energy supply, assist 
economic growth, and benefit export receipts"lO. 
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The 1981 Energy Plan signalled further significant changes of emphasis. Policy "goals" became 
narrowed down to just two. The previous year's other goals became either "guidelines", or were 
dropped altogetherll. The two over-riding goals were to: 
promote the development of indigenous energy resources, both to contribute to national 
energy supply and to produce export-led economic growth, 
reduce New Zealand's dependence on imported oil by the progressive implementation of 
substitution measures selected to minimise increases in the cost of energy supply and use. 
Policy objectives reported in the 1982 Energy Plan were unChanged from the previous year, and were 
considerably downplayed. By the following year there was no reference to goals or guidelines at 
all12. 
105 Discussion 
What can we take from this brief period in New Zealand history, when an exercise in public goal-
setting for energy was carried out, but was quickly subsumed by the single-minded objective of 
reducing dependence on oil? Is it full justification for the view that now dominates Phase 3 
thinking, and that was summed up flatly by the previous Minister of Energy thus: "Government-
sponsored energy planning .. .is incapable of leading to sensible decision-making,,13? There is no 
doubt that the energy process during that time was driven by Government, and that the decisions 
taken were driven by a central planning process rather than by commercial market decisions. Once 
a political commitment had been made to these decisions, they proved impossible to reverse even 
although strong cases against them were made on economic grounds14. 
But what might have happened had the "market" dictated decisions? First, it is worth asking 
whether the Maui gas field would have been discovered as early as it was without exploration 
subsidies15. The answer is "possibly not". But it needs to be remembered that subsidies were in 
place essentially for oil exploration. Had oil been found and not gas the subsequent decision-making 
convolutions would not have occurred. Second, given the discovery of the field, how would Maui 
gas have been used under a full market-based response? Again it is somewhat difficult to speculate. 
However, there must be a strong likelihood that a large quantity of gas would have been flared to 
waste because the owners would have maximised condensate flows and treated the gas as incidental, 
especially if there was no established market for it. 
So while the obvious shortcomings of the Maui decisions have tended to be used to justify a "hands 
off' approach by Government to our energy future, the "evidence" (for what it is) is hardly 
conclusive. Private enterprise is equally capable of turning "tough decisions" (decisions filled with 
ambiguity, uncertainty and conflict) into debacles16. Indeed the explanation for the outcomes we 
have are perhaps more to be found in the process of decision making that was undertaken, and in 
the small-country characteristics of New Zealand. 
Energy decision making quickly became dominated by a technological elite. The LFfB began to 
hold enormous influence in the energy thinking and energy decisions of the time. LFfB thinking 
was directed almost entirely towards supplying conventional indigenous liquid fuels through large 
scale technologies. This thinking soon became the main driving force behind the major energy 
decisions taken in Phase 2. 
This inability to accommodate a wider range of viewpoints was also notable in the views portrayed 
on oil prices. The spectre of ever-increasing oil prices that served as the backdrop for the energy 
decisions was not a view shared by everyone. A minority of economists at the time predicted that 
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continued high oil prices would be unsustainable because of demand-supply imbalance, and 
accurately predicted the slump in oil prices. But contrary opinions were largely ignored17• 
But there are also two important qualifications. First, it was often suggested that actually raying 
for gas not taken so that it could be kept in the ground for future use was a viable option1 . But 
under the rationale of a 10% discount rate, modest annual costs would accumulate rapidly over the 
30-year contract period. Also, the legal situation concerning access to gas not taken after 2008 was 
also unclear19. The Maui agreement set in place a strong imperative to use the gas quickly. 
Second, by choosing to utilise gas as a major source of transport fuel, New Zealand was stepping 
outside the mainstream. The options New Zealand faced were to transform the gas into a fuel 
compatible with the vehicle fleet, or to change the vehicle fleet fuel systems (and supply 
infrastructure) to suit the gas (or a less transformed product of the gas). In the event, by choosing 
both synthetic petrol and CNG, the Government tried to do both, although CNG was somewhat 
incidental to producing synthetic petrol. In effect the government decided that the "disadvantages 
·of producing a more costly, lower octane, and dirtier fuel was preferable to having to modify the 
nation's vehicle fleet and fuel distribution infrastructure,,20. It was a decision to transform the 
energy source to suit the available end-use technology i.e. it was determined by end-use technolOgy. 
How limited were New zealand's options in this choice? The size of New Zealand's vehicle market 
was very small in relation to the international marketplace - there was clearly limited leverage in 
convincing the multinational automobile manufacturing companies to produce cars just for New 
Zealand fuel specifications21. How much would consumer choice have been restricted in vehicle 
types? How far ahead of the international marketplace could New Zealand afford to move? What 
would the economic and political consequences have been? Even with the benefit of hindsight these 
questions are difficult to answer, but they do emphasise one essential truth. Changing the energy 
system, because of the enormous investment (and vested interest) in infrastructure and reliance on 
overseas technologies is extremely difficult. The best intentions in the world face many real 
constraints. These have to be realistically addressed. 
10.6 Conclusions 
In attempting to move down a sustainability pathway it is always useful to see whether we can learn 
from the past. It is easy to identify Government decision making and involvement as a primary 
cause of unsustainable outcomes, and that the Government position as risk taker, particularly in the 
case of the indigenous liquid fuels programme, was inappropriate. It is less easy to assert, as the 
dominant view of Phase 3 thinking asserts, that the "market", left to its own devices would have 
produced a superior outcome. As much as anything we need to acknowledge the real constraints 
that the situation at the time imposed, and to focus on the issues of technology change, and 
shortcomings of the decision making process. Situations of "panic" will inevitably lead to poor 
decision-making. It is a lesson that needs to be applied to today's energy debate. 
Energy goal setting after 1980 essentially became a hollow exercise in justifying the major energy 
decisions. Today the legacy of past energy decisions continues to cast a long shadow over the energy 
scene. The critical issue of energy pricing is discussed in the next chapter. 
Notes and references 
1. The one major difference since 1978 has been the emergence of the issue of CO2 emissions and the potential for 
climate change, with the associated implications for a more globally-oriented energy strategy. Even so, Guideline 
1 from Goals and guidelines recognised that energy issues required an international response. 
54 
2. For an interesting discussion on the background and events surrounding the decision making see: Paterson, M. 
1991. The point at issue - petroleum energy politics in New Zealand 1955-90. Collins, Auckland. 243p. 
3. Fisher, D.E. 1986. Maui gas depletion law and policy. New Zealand Law Journal (February): 52-56. 
4. SmelIie, P. 1990. Maui gas sale latest event in sorry saga. The Press (June). 
5. Quoted in: Fitzsimmons, J. 1981. Synthetic petrol or sustainable fuels. Energywatch Special Publication (August). 
27p. See also Paterson, The point at issue, op. cit. 
6. Several such surveys were carried out, each successive survey forecasting higher future oil prices. See: Boshier, 
1980. Prospects for world oil price. Technical Publication No.5. Ministry of Energy, Wellington; Ministry of 
Energy, 1980. 1980 Energy Plall. Government Printer, Wellington. 75p. Ministry of Energy, 1981. 1981 Energy 
Plall. Government Printer, Wellington. 86p. 
7. McChesney, I.G., Sharp, B.M.H. and Hayward, J.A. 1982. Energy in New Zealand agriculture: current use and 
future trends. Energy in Agriculture 1: 141-153. 
8. Ministry of Energy. 1980. 1980 Energy Plall. Government Printer, Wellington. 75p. 
9. Fitzsimmons, Synthetic petrol or sustainable fuels, op. cit. 
10. Ministry of Energy, 1980 Energy Plan, op. cit. 
11. Ministry of Energy. 1981 Energy Plan, op. cit. 
12. Ministry of Energy, 1982. 1982 Energy Plall. Government Printer, Wellington. 96p; Ministry of Energy, 1983. 
1983 Energy Plall. Government Printer, Wellington. 94p. 
13. Butcher, D. 1990. Letter to The Dominion, (14 September). 
14. See Fitzsimmons, Symhetic petrol or sustainable fuels, op. cit. 
15. I thank Peter Farley for raising this point. 
16. Nutt, P.C. 1990. Preventing decision debacles. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 38: 159-174. 
17. Interestingly, the 1981 Energy Plan, released before the final decision to proceed with the synfuels plant, pointed 
out the looming supply-demand imbalance, suggesting that oil prices would likely fall. However, the 1981 Plan 
persisted with forecasting still higher oil prices in the future. See: Ministry of Energy, 1981 Energy Plan, op. cit. p.23. 
18. The Gas Contract stipulated the Government would pay the Consortium 37 cents per million BTU of gas 
($0.39/GJ), with increases after April 1976 based on one half of the movement of a modified wholesale price index. 
Since Government was a 50% shareholder in the Consortium, payments are effectively halved. 
19. Fisher, Maui gas depletion law and policy, op. cit. 
20. Sperling, D. 1988. New transponation fuels - a strategic approach to technological change. University of California 
Press, Berkeley. 532p. 
21. Ibid. 
55 
56 
CHAPTER 11 
Cheap energy - necessary for competitive advantage? 
11.1 Energy pricing 
The legacy of Government involvement in the energy sector is also one of underpricing indigenous 
energy. That legacy remains today, and is an important determinant of current and future energy 
demand. 
Throughout Phase 1 of policy development, prices for electricity and coal continually failed to cover 
costs. Government made up the shortfall with subsidies. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, for 
instance, electricity prices overall fell short of direct costs by 15%. Taking interest charges on 
capital into account, the shortfall was 36%1. A similar situation applied to coal. In 1968 the losses 
incurred by State Coal were equivalent to 30% of revenue2. Petroleum products, on the other 
hand, most of which were imported, attracted taxes that were used to fund the road network. 
When the Maui gas contract was being negotiated from 1971 to 1973 one of the key issues under 
discussion was the gas price. Since electricity generation was being seen as the main use for Maui 
gas, the rationale behind an appropriate gas price was that it should be set at about the equivalent 
price of fuels used by the New Zealand Electricity Department for its thermally-generated 
electrici~. In effect this meant pricing at somewhere between the price of coal and that of oil. 
Thus was the reasoning behind the gas price of 37 cents per million BTU. But a condition of this 
price was the take-or-pay agreement4• 
Thus, Maui gas was priced on the basis of being competitive mainly with coal (which was already 
subsidised by Government), burnt in thermal power plants at 25-30% efficiency, and sold as 
electricity (the price of which was further subsidised by Government). Clearly, from the start, Maui 
gas was undervalued. Also, by a quirk of timing, the Maui agreement was signed only a few months 
before the first oil shockS. 
Major energy-related decisions have been taken in the last decade predicated on the availability of 
large amounts of cheap energy. But at the same time the New Zealand economy has been opened 
up to competitive pressures. Lowering energy prices became an active Objective in the government's 
policy to increase the competitiveness of New Zealand business and to reduce inflation. In addition, 
local business and farm organisations applied considerable pressure on the government to reduce 
what they regarded as discriminatory taxes on diesel so that they were able to compete on a fairer 
basis with Australian imports (and the Australian home market) under CER. The Minister of 
Energy stated in 1990 that "because it is so central to the wider economic performance, energy is 
seen as a key sector for achievement of cost reductions,,6. 
The net result is that energy prices have consistently declined in real terms for all energy sources 
over the last five years (the exception being petrol over the last 12 months). In part this has been 
due to efficiency gains from within the industry. For petrol and diesel, taxes have been reduced. 
In 1990, industrial electricity prices in New Zealand were the lowest of 19 developed countries. 
Domestic prices were the second lowest7• Petrol and diesel prices are amongst the lowest in the 
DECD, essentially because of a low tax regime. A sample analysis carried out by the Ministry of 
Commerce in 1990 showed that petrol prices in New Zealand were third lowest of nine countries, 
despite having the second highest cost of supply (after Japan)8. Prices for diesel were the lowest 
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of the sample (12 c/litre lower than Australia) and have been reduced further by approximately 
B c/litre with the elimination of excise duty in January 1991)9. Natural gas is still subject to price 
control. One recent analysis has concluded that compared to other OECD countries New Zealand 
consumers face "moderate natural gas prices with a tendency towards becoming a cheap-gas country 
in the 1980s"1O. Of course, the gas price through negotiated contracts with bulk users such as 
Electricorp, is very cheap. And last, coal prices have been on a par with many other countries. 
Many of these low prices have been aided by what has been described in a Ministry of Energy 
analysis as a "patchwork, unsystematic regime" of resource royaltiesll. Currently no royalties 
apply to hydro-electricity or geothermal electricity, while various resource rentals apply to oil, gas 
and coal. Coal in particular attracts a very low rental in relation to other fossil fuels. 
11.2 Rising energy intensity 
Cheap energy produces a number of outcomes that are entirely predictable under "economic 
. rationality". It encourages use. It raises the economic threshold for which efficiency potential can 
be implemented. It encourages energy-intensive activities. And it sets in place patterns of energy 
use and investment that are likely to persist over time. 
It is not surprising therefore that New Zealand has experienced a riSing trend of energy intensity (i.e. 
energy use per $ of GDP) over the last three decades. This has occurred while most other OECD 
countries have achieved a substantial decline in energy/GDP ratios12. Several reasons have been 
offered including the establishment of energy intensive industries, in particular those associated with 
the "think big" era, transport deregulation, labour substitution and declining efficiency of use. 
Indeed, it is interesting to note that the rise in energy per GDP that occurred during the 1980s was 
predicted quite precisely by the Ministry of Energy in the 1981 Energy Plan, based on the anticipated 
changing structure of the New Zealand economy, and in particular the impact of think big13. 
Thus, the rising trend throughout the 1980s has been very consistent with expectations of a decade 
ago. 
Energy intensity trends should not be looked upon solely as indicators of energy trends, though 
Energy/GDP ratios are also the product of GDP trends. In understanding what the trend in these 
ratios implies it is also necessary to look at changes in GDP. For example, there would be much 
less difference in energy/GDP ratios between Japan and New Zealand today if GDP in New Zealand 
had increased at the same rate as that in Japan over the last three decades14. 
While many commentators have looked upon the rising trend of energy/GDP as mainly an indication 
of poor and declining energy efficiency vis a vis other countries, there is little evidence available to 
show that the energy used per (physical) unit of product produced in New Zealand is significantly 
higher than comparable products made in other countries. Rather, the energy/GDP trend should 
be regarded as a broader indication of unsustainable energy-economic trends. 
11.3 Weak economic structure 
As the recent Porter project highlighted, many New Zealand exports are in structurally unattractive 
businesses - facing high competition and low barriers to entry by competing products15. They are 
consequently often caught up in the classic cost-price squeeze. Many products are sold in a bulk or 
semi-processed state, with limited value added. There have been consistent declines in real returns 
from many products over the last few decades as low cost competing countries have entered the 
market to apply downward pressure on prices. In addition of course, the discriminatory nature of 
protection and subsidies particularly in the EC countries provides another reason for diminished 
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export returns. Further, New Zealand now operates an open economy with tariff barriers being 
eliminated or reduced. 
As a result of all this, cheap energy has, over the years, become an essential element of the economy, 
in particular for the export sector but now also for domestic market businesses competing against 
imports. In the past, low energy prices have been an incentive for some energy-intensive industries 
to set up in New Zealand. Now, continued low energy prices are being seen as a survival mechanism 
- as a means of retaining competitiveness in the face of adversity. There are many examples - low 
priced coal for export, for the steel industry and the dairy and meat industries; low priced electricity 
for aluminium and pulp and paper; low priced gas for methanol and urea (and synthetic petrol, some 
of which is exported); and low priced oil products to retain competitiveness in transport. 
The difficulty of course is that this syndrome, once in place, becomes very difficult to break out of 
in an orderly, planned way. Once industries set up to take advantage of cheap energy, there is an 
overwhelming imperative to keep energy cheap, especially when the economy lacks other more 
structurally viable business opportunities. Cheap energy may encourage further energy-intensive 
industries, lock-in inefficiencies and reinforce the status quo. 
11.4 Breaking out of the cycle 
A series of interlocking issues are driving, and reinforcing, an unsustainable energy path in New 
Zealand. This country's economic vulnerability in the 1970s, allied with the search for a use for 
Maui gas, drove a quest for energy self-sufficiency. But to achieve this has required large 
government subsidies, especially after world oil prices dropped in the mid 1980s. The economic 
vulnerability of the country in the 1970s has now been translated into widely acknowledged economic 
weakness in the 1990s, anci, cheap energy is now regarded by many as a necessity because of the 
weakness of the New Zealand economy. 
Cheap energy is a two-edged sword. Access to genuinely sustainable low priced energy offers 
considerable long-term economic advantages, although only if that energy is used efficiently. If the 
low price derives from unsustainable supply conditions then it is creating the pre-conditions for 
economic instability. In New Zealand hydro electricity offers a genuinely sustainable, low cost 
supply of high grade energy (although as we have recently witnessed it is subject to seasonal 
limitations). Geothermal heat offers cheap, long-term energy supplies subject to fiowrate 
restrictions. Coal offers cheapness and reasonably large reserves, but that cheapness derives from 
pricing which delivers low resource rentals and takes no account of external costs. Gas offers 
cheapness because of the extremely low prices set through long-term contracts. At current use rates 
reserves amount to only about 15 years. And petrol and diesel are relatively cheap because of the 
low rates of taxation levied in relation to most other developed countries. By and large, energy is 
relatively cheap because New Zealand chooses to underprice its energy compared with many other 
countries. 
Cheap energy is again being actively promoted by some players in the energy sector as a form of 
"competitive advantage" for New Zealand businesses16. Yet it is a fundamental misinterpretation 
of what competitive advantage is all about. As Professor Porter has painstakingly pointed out, factor 
advantages such as cheap energy may be an ingredient for competitive advantage, but the essential 
ingredients are the application of skills - training, marketing, and innovation17. Cheap energy is 
not a substitute for these skills - in fact New Zealand's abundance of relatively cheap energy in the 
past has probably contributed to the false expectations many people have had about the economy 
in the last two decades. 
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New Zealand needs to break out of the cycle of underpricing energy to retain competitiveness. The 
-reality of the post-Maui energy hole, coming upon us early next decade through continuing with a 
business-a-usual approach, should be reason enough for a fundamental re-appraisal. 
Moving to a sustainable pathway will not be costless. It will require a commitment to the task. But 
if we can broaden our vision, then a new pathway becomes a pathway of enormous potential. 
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CHAPTER 12 
Creating an alternative future 
12.1 Introduction 
The thrust of the arguments developed throughout the preceeding 11 chapters have led inexorably 
to one conclusion - there is a need to focus on a vision of a different pathway for New Zealand's 
energy future: to create, in Hazel Henderson's words an "alternative future"l. 
This chapter pulls together the various strands that have been discussed. The purpose is to outline 
some of the changes that might be required to provide the "nudge" our energy pathway needs to 
change trajectory towards a sustainable system. It is not a detailed agenda for change. That requires 
much further work and analysiS. Nevertheless, the required direction seems clear - it is not business-
as-usual. 
Over the last 18 months, spokepeople for major energy interests have issued dire warnings about 
the consequences of changes to our energy system, and in particular the impact of CO2 targets. "C02 
emissions target threatens New Zealand economy" stated the Director of the Coal Research 
Association. "To achieve such a reduction (in CO2 emissions) would require major regulation 
including carless days and power blackouts" said the General Manager of Electricorp2. The 
Treasury and the Ministry of Commerce have recently echoed these warnings. 
These warnings should not be disregarded. Depending on the way New Zealand chooses to tackle 
its energy future, large additional costs may be imposed. But the problem is that these statements 
are intrinsically tied up with the general approach of the energy industry to the future - that "there 
is no alternative" to business-as-usual. 
The business-as-usual path has been outlined by the Energy Foundation. Criticism of business-as-
usual is not a criticsim of the Foundation's work (indeed it has been a valuable exercise), since the 
Foundation has invited comment and debate. Rather, it is a criticism of: 
the dominance of major interests, with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, 
the lack of participatory structures that would allow for a broader range of interests to be 
represented, 
the dominant focus on short-term issues (Le. CO2 target, deregulation), and a lack of 
longer-term strategic thinking, 
the lack of imagination in energy thinking, 
the recourse to yesterday's solutions to tomorrow's challenges. 
The strategic imperative for New Zealand energy policy over the next decade is to link the 
requirements for CO2 limitations and reductions with a viable energy demand and supply strategy 
for the post-Maui era. A pathway based on the principles of sustainability would seek to: 
improve end-use efficiency and reduce energy transformation losses by a closer matching of 
energy source with energy service. The Objective would be to reduce growth in demand, 
provide economic benefit, and extend the lifetime of gas reserves, 
begin an immediate programme to deploy "non conventional" renewable technologies on 
a small scale, as a prelude to larger scale deployment early next century. 
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122 Moving towards the end of Maui 
A key plank of the sustainable energy pathway is the desirability of slowing the depletion rate of the 
Maui gas field. Slowing the depletion of Maui gas offers environmental benefits and, perhaps more 
importantly, it offers considerable strategic benefits. It would buy further time for the transition to 
renewable energy systems to take place. 
But how realistic is it to expect a slowing in the depletion rate of Maui? The issue is clouded 
somewhat now by claims from the Maul field operators that slowing the depletion rate will cause 
gas to be bound in the field under the action of water pressure drive - claims that are by no means 
accepted by all but difficult to counter. The limited life of the Maui platform has also been raised 
as a reason why a longer depletion period is not advisable. Yet it is difficult to separate these 
technical claims from the purely commercial imperative of the gas owners of maximising short-term 
profitability. 
There still remains the constraints imposed by the Maui agreement. The terms of the contract have 
set in place strong incentives to use the gas quickly. It has been suggested that the contracts be 
renegotiated to slow down the depletion rate3. This will undoubtably cost the Government a 
significant amount in compensation, and one has to ask whether this would be money well spent 
i.e. what is the opportunity cost· of spending money this way? Instead of looking at altering the 
terms of supply, might it not be better to indirectly influence depletion by creating pressure on gas 
users through pricing strategies, and strategies that encourage (and achieve) end-use efficiency. It 
is sobering to reflect on the fact that we are currently depleting our largest reserve of primary fuel 
at a wastage rate of about 75%4. A large part of this wastage is from transformation losses in 
converting gas to electricity and synthetic petrol. Creating strong disincentives against high 
transformation losses by creating a specific tax is suggested in Section 12.4. This would have the 
effectafshifting gas towards higher value uses, with the aim of providing more profitable, but lower 
volume, sales for the present gas owners (Fletcher Challenge and Electricorp). This added 
profitability would also compensate for gas paid for under the "take or pay" agreement but not 
immediately used. 
It is interesting to note that Fletcher Challenge has recently set a target of reversing the declining 
fortunes of CNG and of having 15% of the light vehicle fleet converted to run on CNG over the 
next three to five years5. This represents a long-term commitment to direct use of gas as a 
transport fuel, and is a step along the sustainable energy pathway. A developing market for CNG 
provides many incentives for gas to be depleted at a slower rate, so that the market can be expanded 
and satisfied during the first two decades of next century. It may even provide sufficient incentive 
for the synfuels plant to be closed before the expected date of 2003. And does expanded use of 
CNG provide a potential alternative to using gas for electricity generation, and an opportunity for 
Electricorp to enter the direct use market?6 
Electricorp holds the balance of entitlements to the remaining Maui gas (currently about 1200 PJ). 
Approximately 30% of this gas has been paid for in advance. At present about 50-70 PJ of gas is 
used per y~ar to generate 5000-6500 GWh, approximately one-fifth of electricity end-use demand. 
The marginal cost of generating electricity from gas is currently very low - between two and three 
cents per kilowatt-hour depending on the generation station, and simply reflects the extremely low 
contract price paid for Maui gas. Much of the electricity generated is to meet North Island base-
load demand. Under the business-as-usual scenario, gas use for electricity would increase 
throughout the next decade (apart from a two-three year period following commissioning of the 
Clyde Dam), and a substantial "hole" of about 8000 GWh would have to be filled starting about 
2005. Just how a gradual reduction in gas use for electricity under the assumption of continued 
growth in end-use services would occur needs further consideration. 
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One proposal has recently been outlined by the author? It is based on an alternative way of 
approaching the electricity "hole". It is assumed that demand for electLcity end-use services will 
continue to grow from the present demand of about 31000 GWh to the t;quivalent of 39000 GWh 
by 2010. The approach would: 
achieve a progressive improvement in end-use efficiency (an average of one percent per year 
over the next two decades would reduce the total generation requirement to about 
32000 GWh in 2010), 
develop the potential for small geothermal generating plants it the North Island, 
tap the potential for co-generationS, 
assume some contribution from new-technology solar sources, in particular from wind 
generation (each 100 MW of wind turbine capacity should prcd1Jce about 300 GWh9). 
By 2010 therefore there is a clear potential to move away from an incre:.lsing reliance on fossil fuels 
for generating electricity, and to extend the life of the Maui reseucs. Indeed, many of the 
assumptions that underpin the business-as-usual approach come into q12estion under an alternative 
ViSion. For instance, Electricorp are currently basing their long-ru;(! marginal costs on the 
assumption that the electricity will be generated by coal-fired thermal stations at a cost of 7-8 
cents/kWh. Yet, based on overseas costs, wind energy is likely to match this by the turn of the 
century. If coal attracts a carbon tax (or, as suggested here, a transformation tax), then wind energy 
starts to look "economic" almost immediately (Figure 12.1). 
1985 
Figure 12.1 
• r a'."'\. \ .. ~ 
.. :-:-: .. \ 
I I I I I 
1990 
I I 
1995 
I I I I : ! I 
2000 
Year 
I I 
2005 
I I 
2010 
Projected electricity costs from wind and ph01( voltaics versus coal (coal 
costs based on Electricorp long-run marginal at st; wind and photovoltaic 
costs taken from Box 9.1 and converted to N7..$). 
There are other strategic benefits to be considered also. Small scale renewable systems are low risk 
in that they do not entail high, upfront capital expenditure, and they do not require long lead times 
for construction. They can be deployed as incremental chunks of capadty when needed. They get 
around one of the major problems that has plagued energy development in New Zealand over the 
last two decades - the focus on large energy developments that have overstretched the relatively 
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small New Zealand economy, and created alternative "shortages" and "surpluses" prior to, and after, 
the development. 
The sustainable energy approach outlined above is not fanciful - the more one looks into it the more 
logical and compelling it becomes. 
12.3 Creating a market for energy efficiency 
Last year both the Electricity Supply Association and Electricorp displayed sollie public enthusiasm 
for energy efficiency. Renowned efficiency advocate Amory Lovins was brought to New Zealand, 
and the scope for bringing about large savings through end-use efficiency was given a wide hearing. 
Since then, enthuisiasm has waned as it has become apparent that the large technical efficiency 
improvements that are possible are not going to be achieved overnightlO• In some circles, Lovins' 
star has definitely been on the wane. Is this fair, both to Lovins and to efficiency? It is not, and 
it highlights an ongoing weakness that seems to plague some thinking in the energy sector - to look 
for, and expect, large, quiCk-fIX solutions to energy problems. 
The sustainable energy pathway outlined in Chapter 8 was based on achieving an average of one 
percent per annum improvement in end-use efficiency over business-as-usual. While this may seem 
to be a conveniently rounded and arbitrary figure, it is not. It is a realistic assessment of what is 
readily achievable given some purposeful goals within the right institutional setting. It is based on 
the experience gained by overseas organisations, in particular electricity utilities in the US, that are 
now investing in end-use efficiency. For instance the Con Edison utility from New York has 
instigated a demand-side efficiency programme called "Enlightenment", utilising least-cost solutions 
in order to moderate an expected future growth of 1.3% per annum over the next 18 years. Under 
this pFOgramme they expect growth in demand to be reduced to 0.4% per annum 11. In other 
words, improvement in end-use efficiency will substitute for an equivalent growth in electricity supply 
of 0.9% per annum. 
Presenting efficiency gains as a certain percentage gain per year is also a more accurate means of 
representing reality. One percent per year, for instance, equates to 10% savings by 10% of 
consumers per year: this more accurately reflects the actual way efficiency savings come about. 
Indeed, as Frances Cairncross has recently noted, "conservation is more complicated than supplying 
new power. It involves many small investments rather than a few giant ones,,12. She goes on 
" ... that is why it is ultimately important to find ways to release the force of the market". 
Overseas experience is showing that a combination of regulation and market forces is required to 
achieve the "optimum" level of energy efficiency. Purposeful regulation (changing investment 
criteria and financial incentives) was required to bring about the now growing market in end-use 
efficiency in the United States. In New Zealand the creation of end-use efficiency markets has 
recently been proposed13. The deregulation of electricity franchise areas proposed under the 
Energy Sector Reform Bill is seen by the Electricity Distribution Reform Unit (EDRU) as opening 
up this market potentiall4. If this occurs then the opportunity will surely exist for potentially large 
electricity savings. But there are many potential roadblocks that could thwart this potential e.g. if 
line and energy costs are charged separately to consumers, and the possible disincentives offered by 
Electricorp in their pricing strategies.lS 
A market-based approach to efficiency also raises equity questions. Many of the benefits gained 
from efficiency remain unavailable to lower income people because of lack of access to new 
technologies, poor information etc. If efficiency improvements are also driven by higher energy 
prices, there is the real danger of exacerbating an energy poverty trap - people unable to afford the 
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more efficient technologies, who are forced to both use more energy and to pay a higher price for 
it. Community-based efficiency schemes need to be considered alongside market-based 
initia tives 16. 
12.4 Pricing energy 
The pricing debate cannot be done justice in this one section. Nevertheless, as was discussed in the 
previous chapter, pricing is an essential component of policy if progress towards a sustainable energy 
pathway is to be made. In the short term, pricing policy needs to recognise the need to ensure 
industry viability and fairness to consumers, while encouraging the shift to a sustainable pathway. 
Therefore, preserving the relative cheapness of New Zealand's genuinely sustainable energy supplies, 
while creating strong disincentives at the margin for energy waste and increased consumption of 
energy sources, would seem to be an important principle. The following points need to be 
considered. 
Pricing is not only about quantity, it is also about structure. Recent suggestions to allow 
electricity fIXed costs to become fixed charges for consumers is both contrary to wise 
resource use and to normal pricing procedures17. It will unquestionably be a major 
disincentive to encourage efficient electricity use. It is interesting to note that in Germany 
the response to CO2 emission targets is eliciting the opposite response - a move to reduce 
their current high fixed charges, and a loading of costs back on to energy charges18. 
Alternative pricing structures, such as the "progressive tariff' proposal19 need to be 
investigated thoroughly. 
The ramifications of revenue-neutral energy price increases (where increased energy taxes 
are compensated for by tax reductions in other areas), through such mechanisms as a carbon 
tax, need to be examined in detail. The fact that extra revenue is fed back into the economy 
in other ways is often overlooked in discussions on the effect of a carbon tax. 
A variation on an across-the-board carbon tax is a transformation tax where the tax is 
specifically applied to fossil energy that is transformed to other energy types (e.g. gas and 
coal to electricity, gas to petrol). This would not affect the cost of energy where the 
transformation losses for energy are low or non-existent (i.e. coal used for basic heating 
applications), but it would steeply increase costs at the margin for activities such as thermal 
generation. It would be a relatively painless way of adjusting the market distortions caused 
by the very cheap gas contract price, although for electricity, a transformation tax would 
probably need to be associated with a progressive block tariff to ensure that hydro and 
geothermal prices were not simply ratcheted upwards in line with increased gas costs, as 
occurs at present.20 
One way around the current impasse over energy price increases and the need to retain 
competitiveness would be to signal phased price increases in the long term. In that way, 
businesses do not have to bear higher energy costs in the short term, but do have the right 
signals for investment decisions in the longer term. 
The basic principle of requiring least-cost energy supply (where investment in effiCiency is equated 
to a form of "supply") is appealing but has the following qualifications. First, it will only be truly 
successful if there is a "level playing field" where all energy sources are priced to include true social 
and environmental costs. Second, there may be national strategiC reasons for making some 
anticipatory investments that are not in the short term the least cost option. For instance, some 
early investment in renewables can be justified for the strategic benefits that may accrue in the 
longer term, even although that investment today is not necessarily the cheapest option. As a basic 
principle this "early" investment in renewables should be funded by taxes on fossil fuels i.e. a 
transition tax. 
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12.S Investing in solar 
If solar technologies are to fill the energy gap early next century, and provide a progressively 
increasing proportion of energy supply, New Zealand has three options: (1) import most of the 
required hardware, (2) create a local industry base to produce the hardware, or (3) a mix of both. 
At present, to all intents and purposes, New Zealand does not have a solar industry. Given this 
current situation the option to import seems logical. We would be able to buy-in to the latest 
technologies, and take advantage of two to three decades of R&D, the cost of which has been borne 
by other countries. This would seem to be the simple solution. But does it make the most of the 
potential opportunities that solar technologies could provide? What would be the potential benefits 
from New Zealand developing a solar industry base? 
The rationale for moving to solar energy is the advantage it offers both environmentally and 
economically (in the future). The rationale for creating a major solar energy industry in New 
Zealand would have to be economically determined, but it offers two potential benefits: 
the prospect of an internationally competitive industry, 
a positive contribution to technology transfer to developing countries. 
What is the prospect for creating a competitive industry base? Robert Reich, writing recently in 
Scientific American on the decline of US technological competitiveness, argued that the first step 
towards technological pre-eminence was to "scan the globe for new insights,,21. One particular 
insight seems clear and unmistakable. There is a quietly developing global market for renewable 
technologies that within a decade or two could become huge22. 
Should New Zealand undertake the risky strategy of setting up an industry where there is no existing 
home base? There is no question that New Zealand needs new types of business that will enhance 
international competitiveness. It is unlikely that our current stock of existing industries can, on their 
own, evolve sufficiently to maintain economic welfare. New industries are required that are 
responsive to new market opportunities. But, interestingly, while there is no solar industry as such 
in the country, we would not necessarily be starting off from scratch. The Porter project gave us 
some useful insights into the value of industry "clusters" that enhance and reinforce competitive 
advantage23. A solar technology industry for instance would not just rely on devices to turn solar 
energy into some other energy form. Just as important will be control and management systems, 
possibly storage systems, materials suppliers, plus other types of infrastructure support, as well as 
downstream utilisation technologies. Arguably, some aspects ofthe necessary cluster around a solar-
based industry already exist. For instance, New Zealand has an internationally competitive software 
industry, and an emerging electronics industry, both of which conceivably would have an important 
role in control systems. Turbine construction for wind generators can make use of New Zealand's 
leading edge boat building technologies24. Recent battery technology breakthroughs have come 
from a New Zealand inventor. And we should not forget of course the considerable expertise that 
has been built up by New Zealanders in conventional hydro and geothermal technolOgy. The 
integration of new-technology solar systems with conventional renewable technologies into grid 
systems will be important. And as well as having the technical ability New Zealand also has the 
other necessary ingredient for establishing a competitive industry base - the factor advantage of 
strong fluxes of natural solar energy. 
The second point is technology transfer. The importance of achieving technology transfer to 
developing countries was stressed earlier in Section A. Unsurprisingly, it is becoming a central issue 
in the negotiations leading up to UNCED next year in Brazil. The World Bank has recently 
indicated that support of renewable energy sources will be a priority under its Environmental Action 
Program25. Recently, External Relations Minister Mr McKinnon indicated that New Zealand's 
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level of aid-giving to developing countries was inadequate and needed to increase. Clearly there is 
the potential for targeted assistance in solar technologies (the technologies themselves, or expertise, 
joint ventures etc.). 
Up until now New Zealand's stance on CO2 emission reductions has been based on moral suasion -
symbolically important but unlikely on its own to have much effect. If New Zealand is really 
serious about reducing CO2 emissions globally, then it needs to be rather more positive in its 
approach. The ability to provide solar-based technologies and technological expertise would be one 
of the more positive approaches New Zealand could take. 
12.6 Expanding our horizons 
According to Charles Handy, times of discontinuous change require discontinuous, or "upside-down 
thinking,,26. We need to look at things in a new way. We need to look for new opportunities in 
the face of adverse times. Upside-down thinking changes nothing "but the way we think". It is part 
of the process of breaking out of business-as-usual (Box 12.1). 
Of course, these are not ideas of the future, they are ideas of the present. Amory Lovins has come 
up with the "negawau" concept, a number of US utilities are re-orientating to become energy service 
providers, oil companies are investing in photovoltaics, one Japanese company is now producing 
photovoltaic roof tiles, to mention just a few. The future is with us now. 
It is important that we are in a position to evolve into the opportunities and challenges as they 
unfold over the next two to three decades. We should not be waiting a decade until the energy gap 
appears before considering renewables. That process should begin now. Wind energy probably 
offers the most promising immediate prospect for utilisation. Overseas, wind energy is becoming 
economic now in countries that are less windy than New Zealand. For a country with the wind 
energy potential of New Zealand, its lack of development so far is disappointing. The proposal put 
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forward by Electricorp for a single wind turbine to be installed near Wellington is welcome but 
hardly sufficient to gain the necessary field experience. As a high priority we need to investigate 
mechanisms to ensure an immediate investment in wind energy, so that the country can move quickly 
onto the technological learning curve. Overseas, wind energy has been established through 
government subsidies, and compulsory obligation-to-buy schemes. It defies all overseas experience 
to expect "the market" on its own, to deliver this outcome. 
At the very least, the prospects for making a transition into renewables over the next two decades 
demands an immediate enquiry sponsored by Government, and involving a broad range of interest 
groups. It is interesting that in the UK a Parliamentary Select Committee, and a Department of 
Energy Special Advisory Group are both examining with some urgency why Britain is lagging behind 
some European countries in its utilisation of renewables27. 
The sustainable energy pathway requires that we define some direction for energy supply (and 
demand) at a national level. We need, in other words an energy strategy. In order to do this we 
must reject some of the more extreme notions of Phase 3 thinking. The view that there is "nothing 
special about energy", and that energy decisions can be handled by private "competitive markets" 
under light-handed regulation is appealing, but in the words of Fletcher Challenge "there is no 
evidence that market forces in isolation will produce rational solutions to New Zealand's energy 
problems,,28. Nevertheless, all interest groups have their own agendas, and the sorts of 
interventions being sought by various players are not necessarily designed to meet sustainability 
objectives. We urgently need to develop new participatory mechanisms that will allow a broader 
participation into the energy policy process, and avoid the dominant business-as-usual thinking that 
is clearly a feature at present. It is a Government responsibility to facilitate this process. 
A sustainable energy pathway requires us to adopt a new vision, and a positive approach to Change. 
New technologies are changing the world, and they are changing the way in which we can approach 
our energy future. Wheras a decade ago New Zealand faced some real technological constraints that 
limited the decision-making options, current teChnology development looks set to broaden our 
options in the future. Supply and end-use technologies are starting down a transformation pathway. 
The information revolution is spinning off benefits to the energy industry through such devices as 
"smart" meters and computerised control systems. Even relatively simple changes, such as using new 
time-of-use electricity meters, have the potential to alter completely the interaction between 
electricity supplier and customers, and patterns of energy use. New technOlogy, brought on by new 
needs, will reinforce new approaches by energy suppliers and vica versa. A new energy pathway that 
substitutes information for energy, that encourages technological innovation, and that is dedicated 
to providing energy services in an economical and environmentally benign manner is not only a 
pathway of opportunity but also a pathway of "fun and excitment,,29. 
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CHAPTER 13 
From threat .... to opportunity 
The global energy system is in bad shape. Emissions from the burning of fossil fuels, the world's 
main energy source, is threatening the global environment. Emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse 
gases are increasing steadily, enhancing the likelihood of widespread climatic change early next 
century. Meanwhile, oil reserves will become progressively maldistributed over the next two decades 
as many country's reserves are depleted, and this will likely exacerbate economic and political 
tensions. In short, the global energy system is unsustainable. 
New Zealand is one of a handful of countries taking an activist role in setting a CO2 emission 
reduction target. That New Zealand's effort, on its own, will bring about an insignificant reduction 
in emissions in relation to the global total is a well recognised fact. The policy is however, 
acknowledgement that developed countries in particular, have a moral responsibility to act, despite 
uncertainties. 
However, some of the largest players in the energy industry in New Zealand see the target as a 
"threat". Electricorp and Coalcorp have both argued that such a target will impose large costs on 
the economy, at a time when the country can least afford it. What should we make of such claims? 
We should note that these claims are assertions, and that they come from two large energy players 
who have an interest in maintaining the status quo. But we should not dismiss these claims lightly 
because they may well be correct if we continue to take a conventional approach to the problem. 
The conventional, or business-as-usual, approach may well become increasingly costly to break out 
of. Business-as-usual undervalues energy, encourages energy waste, and encourages a self-reinforcing 
cycle of underpricing energy to maintain competitiveness. Business-as-usual looks to yesterday'S 
technologies to meet tomorrow's challenges. It fails to provide the environmentally-benign 
technologies that will be needed by developing countries if they are to avoid the potentially 
environmentally catastrophic fossil fuel industrialisation phase that many of these countries are 
heading into. Business-as-usual will fail completely to bring CO2 emissions under control. 
New Zealand desperately needs to break out of its business-as-usual approach to energy. New 
Zealand needs a vision of a new energy pathway. Fortunately; the principles of sustainability 
provides one. The combination of efficiency (transformation and end-use) and renewable energy 
technologies seems irresistible. 
An early move towards developing new-technology solar systems appears to be an opportunity of 
considerable promise. It demands immediate and thorough analysis. The next few years provide a 
unique opportunity for New Zealand to move quickly onto the technological learning curve. The 
anticipated secure energy supply situation for the next decade provides a stable base to phase in a 
new energy era. 
The New Zealand Government is looking to meet its greenhouse targets by utilising "win-win" 
strategies. An early move towards a sustainable energy pathway offers hope for considerably better 
than that: 
WIN confront the looming supply "gap" and move towards a permanently sustainable 
energy system 
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bring CO2 emissions under control and rapidly reduce them after the turn of the 
century 
create an industry base built on genuine competitive advantage, with a captive 
world market 
develop and deploy the technology to allow developing countries to leap-frog the 
fossil fuel development phase. 
It will however, require an evolving transformation in our approach to energy. It will require a 
national commitment to energy policy, and a purposeful commitment towards meeting energy 
objectives. What needs to be given urgent attention is the required "nudge" to get this process 
underway. But once on that pathway, there is reason to believe that the evolutionary process of 
change will provide mutual reinforcement for the required transformation. New technologies will 
reinforce new institutions, which will reinforce new values, and vice versa. 
And perhaps, as Amory Lovins argued 15 years ago: 
"If we get our energy policy right many other kinds of policy will tend to fall into place 
too"l. 
Now that would be too good an opportunity to pass up. 
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